A theoretical critique of deterrence-based policy

Abstract

Objectives

Deterrence-based policies are central to criminal justice, assumed greater prominence in recent decades, and have assumed that more and tougher punishment necessarily deters crime. This paper provides a theoretical critique of deterrence to identify the limits and possibilities of effective deterrence-based criminal justice policy.

Methods

We build on prior work and recent advances in scholarship to develop a theoretical critique and a theoretical basis for improving deterrence-based policy.

Results

The critique identifies fundamental problems with classical deterrence theory that undermine the likely effectiveness of extant deterrence-based policies. We identify theoretical dimensions that address these problems and that can guide policies in ways that increase the likelihood of appreciable deterrent effects on crime.

Conclusions

Deterrence-based policies based on classical deterrence theory, and variants of it, are unlikely to be appreciably effective and are not consistent with an evidence-based approach to policy. If deterrence policies are to be used, designing them around a coherent and systematic conceptualization of deterrence holds greater potential for reducing crime and would highlight the role that rewards for prosocial behavior can play in deterring crime.