{"title":"Information asymmetry and public response: Evidence from the housing market","authors":"Xiaodong Wang , Guimei Feng , Jiayi Xu , Li Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112039","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper takes the introduction of commission collection from sellers in the Chinese housing market as a significant shock, and reveals the role that information asymmetry plays in the market by examining the public's response to two types of commission collection. Our findings indicate that when sellers transition from a commission model that is solely borne by buyers to one that is shared between both buyers and sellers, the listing prices of housing decline significantly, by approximately 1.6 % to 2.3 %. In contrast, when sellers face no change in the commission structure, their listing prices do not show a significant decline. This reduction is primarily attributed to the new commission model mitigating the information asymmetry that sellers experience. This research offers valuable insights into the impact of information asymmetry in housing markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 112039"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524005238","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper takes the introduction of commission collection from sellers in the Chinese housing market as a significant shock, and reveals the role that information asymmetry plays in the market by examining the public's response to two types of commission collection. Our findings indicate that when sellers transition from a commission model that is solely borne by buyers to one that is shared between both buyers and sellers, the listing prices of housing decline significantly, by approximately 1.6 % to 2.3 %. In contrast, when sellers face no change in the commission structure, their listing prices do not show a significant decline. This reduction is primarily attributed to the new commission model mitigating the information asymmetry that sellers experience. This research offers valuable insights into the impact of information asymmetry in housing markets.
期刊介绍:
Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.