Information asymmetry and public response: Evidence from the housing market

IF 2.1 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Xiaodong Wang , Guimei Feng , Jiayi Xu , Li Zhang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper takes the introduction of commission collection from sellers in the Chinese housing market as a significant shock, and reveals the role that information asymmetry plays in the market by examining the public's response to two types of commission collection. Our findings indicate that when sellers transition from a commission model that is solely borne by buyers to one that is shared between both buyers and sellers, the listing prices of housing decline significantly, by approximately 1.6 % to 2.3 %. In contrast, when sellers face no change in the commission structure, their listing prices do not show a significant decline. This reduction is primarily attributed to the new commission model mitigating the information asymmetry that sellers experience. This research offers valuable insights into the impact of information asymmetry in housing markets.
信息不对称与公众反应:来自住房市场的证据
本文以中国房地产市场引入卖方收取佣金为重大冲击,通过研究公众对两种佣金收取方式的反应,揭示了信息不对称在市场中的作用。我们的研究结果表明,当卖方从完全由买方承担佣金的模式过渡到由买卖双方共同承担佣金的模式时,房屋挂牌价格会大幅下降,降幅约为 1.6% 至 2.3%。相比之下,当卖家面临的佣金结构没有变化时,他们的挂牌价格并没有出现大幅下降。这种下降主要归因于新的佣金模式缓解了卖家的信息不对称。这项研究为了解住房市场信息不对称的影响提供了宝贵的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Economics Letters
Economics Letters ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.00%
发文量
348
审稿时长
30 days
期刊介绍: Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.
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