The postmodern era of environmental regulation

IF 3 4区 环境科学与生态学 Q2 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
John Toll
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If you find yourself working on a site where the risk or potential risk reduction is relatively low, beware: Such sites can be more difficult to close. Stakeholders often mistrust experts who tell them that a site is not badly polluted, especially if remediation might be a gateway to restoration or redevelopment opportunities.</p><p>My pragmatic side recognizes that people, by and large, are rational actors.</p><p>If behaviors seem irrational, then we should suspect that we misunderstand what motivates those behaviors. As environmental scientists and engineers, we are trained to collect and analyze data to gradually reveal the truth of a matter. That's fine up to a point, but the logic breaks down when we buy into the belief that environmental data and their analyses hold the answers to environmental problems. We overvalue data on environmental conditions and undervalue data on human values and motivations. This fundamental misconception leads to misunderstandings, which lead to frustration. Frustration makes us vulnerable to being drawn into what, in my 2020 editorial, I called the “regulatory-industrial complex.” The “regulatory-industrial complex” rewards people for enabling and indulging risk aversion because, frankly, fearmongering pays and most of us need paychecks. In the United States alone, we're spending billions of dollars (USD) to remediate (and litigate) contaminated sites, with little evidence that these investments are paying off in reduced risk. Were I to indulge my cynicism, I might say that these expenditures are meant to fund careers rather than mitigate risk.</p><p>This problem is on track to get worse before it gets better. Remedial investigations at contaminated sites in the United States generally focus on Toxic and Priority Pollutants. The Toxic Chemicals list is found at 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 401, §401.15 (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-N/part-401/section-401.15) and the Priority Pollutants list is found in Appendix A to 40 CFR Part 423 (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-N/part-423/appendix-Appendix%20A%20to%20Part%20423). Both lists specify chemicals regulated in the United States for which we have developed analytical test methods. Note that the Toxic and Priority Pollutants that we study in contaminated site investigations generally do not include contaminants of emerging concern (CECs). CECs comprise chemicals that are widely used (e.g., pharmaceuticals and personal care products) and chemicals that were in widespread use until recently, like polyfluorinated alkyl substances (PFAS). Ling's (<span>2024</span>) recent paper can be seen as support for the “worse before it gets better” assertion. The author reports that “current costs to remove and destroy the total PFAS mass released annually into the environment would likely exceed the global gross domestic product of 106 trillion USD.” Thus, remediation, which is already cost prohibitive, could get a lot more expensive unless we find cheaper, better solutions to pollution problems.</p><p>Less emphasis on chemical exposure, and more emphasis on whether and how chemicals affect ecosystem services and function, would be a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, we have installed institutional barriers that make it difficult to change course. I learned this in the 1990s. At the time, I was working on various projects tasked with helping plan 30-year combined sewer overflow (CSO) control programs. My team conducted technical studies that focused on chemical and pathogen fate and effects. One site stands out in my memory, because of the stakeholder involvement process. We met monthly with the stakeholder group throughout the life of the three-year project. We presented our work, answered questions from stakeholders, and used their advice to guide next steps. At the end of the three years, the stakeholder group wrote the final report for the elected official making the CSO control decision. The report recommended the less expensive of two CSO control programs presented, with one caveat: It wanted the money that wouldn't be spent on more stringent CSO controls to be used on restoration projects in the service area where the CSOs were located. The answer from the official decision maker was that the money was earmarked for remediation and couldn't be used for restoration. In response, the stakeholder group reversed its position and recommended the more expensive program.</p><p>At this project site, the less stringent CSO control option would have managed risks from chemical and pathogen exposures just as well as the more stringent option, at a savings of hundreds of millions (USD) over the 30-year life of the program. The risk that drove the stakeholder group was caused by habitat degradation, and the associated lost benefits that the ecosystem would provide if restored. Today, after nearly 30 years, the program is nearing completion. The money was spent on CSO controls only. Funds for restoration haven't appeared, at least not on the scale that the stakeholder group envisioned. As a result, restoration hasn't happened, and the benefits to fish, wildlife, and people have been lost.</p><p>Our habit of defining ecological risk assessment endpoints and justifying remediation decisions in terms of toxic effects on test organisms—not on populations, communities, ecological services, or even measures of ecosystem function (e.g., Patrício et al., <span>2006</span>)—has proved hard to break. This is a good place to revisit my initial argument: that environmental regulations provide the motive, means, and opportunity to spend too much time and money on relatively minor problems. In the CSO example, the environmental risks that would have continued under the less stringent, less expensive control option were <i>de minimis</i>, but we spent 30 years and hundreds of millions of dollars fixing them anyway.</p><p>Remediation can't eliminate Toxic and Priority Pollutants from the environment, much less CECs, and yet, we keep turning to remediation as the solution to pollution. Therefore, we have a problem not only with pollution but also with incentive. The incentive structure upon which the environmental compliance industry is built is flawed, and fixing it is going to take regulatory reform. Not radical reform, mind you—just sensible reform.</p><p>Just this simple modification could trigger profound changes in the way we think about pollution problems. It would put pollution on a more even footing with the myriad other problems—and opportunities—that human societies engender. Why? Because it would tie chemical exposure to meaningful impacts that should be the basis for laws and regulations: specifically, measurable population health outcomes and clearly understood goals for ecological protection.</p><p>I suspect that most IEAM readers identify as environmental toxicologists, chemists, or risk assessors, professions that focus on controlling exposures to toxic chemicals. Clearly, that focus is narrower than global sustainability. What might be less clear is that a focus solely or primarily on controlling exposures to toxic chemicals does not necessarily align with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Environmental toxicologists, chemists, and risk assessors can contribute to achieving the SDGs, particularly SDGs 3 and 6, but unless and until we come to terms with the regulatory deficiencies baked into our professional practices, any progress toward those SDGs will be too expensive and too slow.</p><p>By drawing attention and resources away from a sustainability initiative, our professions could arguably contribute to the failure to achieve any semblance of the 2030 Agenda. We are busy working under regulatory mandates that, at best, produce incremental reductions in contaminant concentrations in environmental media. Any gains in ecosystem services are simply fortuitous, <i>because ecosystem services aren't a factor in remedial decisions</i>. Public health gains might be achieved, but remedies are based on hypothetical exposure assumptions that exaggerate real public health benefits.</p><p>At the end of 2024, we'll be halfway from the turn of the millennium to 2050. So, for a moment, let's be generous and push back the deadline for achieving something like the 2030 Agenda to 2050. Think about the environmental progress that we've made in the quarter century since the year 2000. If we set ourselves to the task, could we retool regulations fast enough to make a meaningful contribution to achieving the United Nations' goals in the next quarter century?</p><p>My answer, despite my cynicism, is yes. What would it take? The environmental science professions would have to reorganize. Hazard assessment would be drastically de-emphasized, except in the product registration and safety domains, which would experience less disruption than pollution control and remediation specialties. Population- and community-level ecological assessment endpoints would become much more central to our analyses. Compensatory mitigation would become a major compliance measure beyond its current use in wetland loss permitting. Engineering With Nature®—a US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) initiative that seeks to intentionally align natural and engineering processes to efficiently and sustainably deliver economic, environmental and social benefits through collaboration, and other like-minded initiatives (e.g., https://www.ecoshape.org/en/)—would rapidly spread.</p><p>Systems ecology, conservation biology, forestry, and other agricultural sciences; multiple branches of economics (e.g., engineering, natural resource, and political economics); geography; social anthropology; applied statistics; decision theory; and other professions would take their places alongside toxicology, chemistry, chemical fate modeling, and risk assessment as essential foundations of regulatory and other decision-making systems, as well as expanding stressors of concern beyond chemical. Truely adaptive management (Walters, <span>1986</span>), backed by rigorously designed, executed, and analyzed field studies, could become routine practice. Failures resulting from well-designed, vetted experiments could be treated as successes, if properly adapted to. A great many lawyers and policy analysts could find work creating rules and regulations that reward resiliency and innovation, enabling scientists and engineers to experiment with large-scale, safe-fail field trials of creative solutions to big problems. Universities and colleges could scale up their offerings and environmental firms would welcome a surge of new professionals into their practices. Professional societies like SETAC could experience membership growth and produce joint programming with allied disciplines.</p><p>The changes that our professions would experience if society truly committed to achieving some semblance of the 2030 Agenda by 2050 would be profound and exciting, because the work would expand not just in volume but also in meaning and import. The opportunities would be endless. 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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Four years ago this month, I published an editorial in Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management (IEAM) titled “The Modern Era of Environmental Regulation” (Toll, 2020), a synopsis of the first 50 years of the modern era. It applauded improvements in environmental quality achieved by regulating chemical pollution, but it criticized the environmental regulatory framework and the profession that had developed to serve it. My concern was that environmental regulations provided the motive, means, and opportunity to spend too much time and money on relatively minor problems.

That concern hasn't ebbed. I've become both more cynical and more pragmatic. I've come to appreciate the importance of trust. Risk aversion creates mistrust, making smaller problems more difficult to solve than bigger ones. If you find yourself working on a site where the risk or potential risk reduction is relatively low, beware: Such sites can be more difficult to close. Stakeholders often mistrust experts who tell them that a site is not badly polluted, especially if remediation might be a gateway to restoration or redevelopment opportunities.

My pragmatic side recognizes that people, by and large, are rational actors.

If behaviors seem irrational, then we should suspect that we misunderstand what motivates those behaviors. As environmental scientists and engineers, we are trained to collect and analyze data to gradually reveal the truth of a matter. That's fine up to a point, but the logic breaks down when we buy into the belief that environmental data and their analyses hold the answers to environmental problems. We overvalue data on environmental conditions and undervalue data on human values and motivations. This fundamental misconception leads to misunderstandings, which lead to frustration. Frustration makes us vulnerable to being drawn into what, in my 2020 editorial, I called the “regulatory-industrial complex.” The “regulatory-industrial complex” rewards people for enabling and indulging risk aversion because, frankly, fearmongering pays and most of us need paychecks. In the United States alone, we're spending billions of dollars (USD) to remediate (and litigate) contaminated sites, with little evidence that these investments are paying off in reduced risk. Were I to indulge my cynicism, I might say that these expenditures are meant to fund careers rather than mitigate risk.

This problem is on track to get worse before it gets better. Remedial investigations at contaminated sites in the United States generally focus on Toxic and Priority Pollutants. The Toxic Chemicals list is found at 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 401, §401.15 (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-N/part-401/section-401.15) and the Priority Pollutants list is found in Appendix A to 40 CFR Part 423 (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-N/part-423/appendix-Appendix%20A%20to%20Part%20423). Both lists specify chemicals regulated in the United States for which we have developed analytical test methods. Note that the Toxic and Priority Pollutants that we study in contaminated site investigations generally do not include contaminants of emerging concern (CECs). CECs comprise chemicals that are widely used (e.g., pharmaceuticals and personal care products) and chemicals that were in widespread use until recently, like polyfluorinated alkyl substances (PFAS). Ling's (2024) recent paper can be seen as support for the “worse before it gets better” assertion. The author reports that “current costs to remove and destroy the total PFAS mass released annually into the environment would likely exceed the global gross domestic product of 106 trillion USD.” Thus, remediation, which is already cost prohibitive, could get a lot more expensive unless we find cheaper, better solutions to pollution problems.

Less emphasis on chemical exposure, and more emphasis on whether and how chemicals affect ecosystem services and function, would be a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, we have installed institutional barriers that make it difficult to change course. I learned this in the 1990s. At the time, I was working on various projects tasked with helping plan 30-year combined sewer overflow (CSO) control programs. My team conducted technical studies that focused on chemical and pathogen fate and effects. One site stands out in my memory, because of the stakeholder involvement process. We met monthly with the stakeholder group throughout the life of the three-year project. We presented our work, answered questions from stakeholders, and used their advice to guide next steps. At the end of the three years, the stakeholder group wrote the final report for the elected official making the CSO control decision. The report recommended the less expensive of two CSO control programs presented, with one caveat: It wanted the money that wouldn't be spent on more stringent CSO controls to be used on restoration projects in the service area where the CSOs were located. The answer from the official decision maker was that the money was earmarked for remediation and couldn't be used for restoration. In response, the stakeholder group reversed its position and recommended the more expensive program.

At this project site, the less stringent CSO control option would have managed risks from chemical and pathogen exposures just as well as the more stringent option, at a savings of hundreds of millions (USD) over the 30-year life of the program. The risk that drove the stakeholder group was caused by habitat degradation, and the associated lost benefits that the ecosystem would provide if restored. Today, after nearly 30 years, the program is nearing completion. The money was spent on CSO controls only. Funds for restoration haven't appeared, at least not on the scale that the stakeholder group envisioned. As a result, restoration hasn't happened, and the benefits to fish, wildlife, and people have been lost.

Our habit of defining ecological risk assessment endpoints and justifying remediation decisions in terms of toxic effects on test organisms—not on populations, communities, ecological services, or even measures of ecosystem function (e.g., Patrício et al., 2006)—has proved hard to break. This is a good place to revisit my initial argument: that environmental regulations provide the motive, means, and opportunity to spend too much time and money on relatively minor problems. In the CSO example, the environmental risks that would have continued under the less stringent, less expensive control option were de minimis, but we spent 30 years and hundreds of millions of dollars fixing them anyway.

Remediation can't eliminate Toxic and Priority Pollutants from the environment, much less CECs, and yet, we keep turning to remediation as the solution to pollution. Therefore, we have a problem not only with pollution but also with incentive. The incentive structure upon which the environmental compliance industry is built is flawed, and fixing it is going to take regulatory reform. Not radical reform, mind you—just sensible reform.

Just this simple modification could trigger profound changes in the way we think about pollution problems. It would put pollution on a more even footing with the myriad other problems—and opportunities—that human societies engender. Why? Because it would tie chemical exposure to meaningful impacts that should be the basis for laws and regulations: specifically, measurable population health outcomes and clearly understood goals for ecological protection.

I suspect that most IEAM readers identify as environmental toxicologists, chemists, or risk assessors, professions that focus on controlling exposures to toxic chemicals. Clearly, that focus is narrower than global sustainability. What might be less clear is that a focus solely or primarily on controlling exposures to toxic chemicals does not necessarily align with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Environmental toxicologists, chemists, and risk assessors can contribute to achieving the SDGs, particularly SDGs 3 and 6, but unless and until we come to terms with the regulatory deficiencies baked into our professional practices, any progress toward those SDGs will be too expensive and too slow.

By drawing attention and resources away from a sustainability initiative, our professions could arguably contribute to the failure to achieve any semblance of the 2030 Agenda. We are busy working under regulatory mandates that, at best, produce incremental reductions in contaminant concentrations in environmental media. Any gains in ecosystem services are simply fortuitous, because ecosystem services aren't a factor in remedial decisions. Public health gains might be achieved, but remedies are based on hypothetical exposure assumptions that exaggerate real public health benefits.

At the end of 2024, we'll be halfway from the turn of the millennium to 2050. So, for a moment, let's be generous and push back the deadline for achieving something like the 2030 Agenda to 2050. Think about the environmental progress that we've made in the quarter century since the year 2000. If we set ourselves to the task, could we retool regulations fast enough to make a meaningful contribution to achieving the United Nations' goals in the next quarter century?

My answer, despite my cynicism, is yes. What would it take? The environmental science professions would have to reorganize. Hazard assessment would be drastically de-emphasized, except in the product registration and safety domains, which would experience less disruption than pollution control and remediation specialties. Population- and community-level ecological assessment endpoints would become much more central to our analyses. Compensatory mitigation would become a major compliance measure beyond its current use in wetland loss permitting. Engineering With Nature®—a US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) initiative that seeks to intentionally align natural and engineering processes to efficiently and sustainably deliver economic, environmental and social benefits through collaboration, and other like-minded initiatives (e.g., https://www.ecoshape.org/en/)—would rapidly spread.

Systems ecology, conservation biology, forestry, and other agricultural sciences; multiple branches of economics (e.g., engineering, natural resource, and political economics); geography; social anthropology; applied statistics; decision theory; and other professions would take their places alongside toxicology, chemistry, chemical fate modeling, and risk assessment as essential foundations of regulatory and other decision-making systems, as well as expanding stressors of concern beyond chemical. Truely adaptive management (Walters, 1986), backed by rigorously designed, executed, and analyzed field studies, could become routine practice. Failures resulting from well-designed, vetted experiments could be treated as successes, if properly adapted to. A great many lawyers and policy analysts could find work creating rules and regulations that reward resiliency and innovation, enabling scientists and engineers to experiment with large-scale, safe-fail field trials of creative solutions to big problems. Universities and colleges could scale up their offerings and environmental firms would welcome a surge of new professionals into their practices. Professional societies like SETAC could experience membership growth and produce joint programming with allied disciplines.

The changes that our professions would experience if society truly committed to achieving some semblance of the 2030 Agenda by 2050 would be profound and exciting, because the work would expand not just in volume but also in meaning and import. The opportunities would be endless. Are we up to the challenge?

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

环境监管的后现代时代
报告建议采用所提交的两个 CSO 控制方案中成本较低的方案,但有一个前提条件:报告希望将不用于更严格的 CSO 控制的资金用于 CSO 所在服务区的修复项目。官方决策者的回答是,这笔钱专门用于补救,不能用于修复。作为回应,利益相关者小组改变了立场,建议采用成本更高的方案。在该项目现场,较宽松的 CSO 控制方案与较宽松的方案一样,都可以管理化学物质和病原体暴露的风险,而且在 30 年的方案有效期内可以节省数亿美元。驱动利益相关者小组的风险是栖息地退化造成的,以及生态系统恢复后将带来的相关利益损失。如今,经过近 30 年的时间,该计划已接近尾声。资金仅用于 CSO 控制。用于恢复的资金还没有出现,至少没有达到利益相关者小组所设想的规模。我们习惯于定义生态风险评估终点,并根据对测试生物的毒性影响而非对种群、群落、生态服务或甚至生态系统功能的衡量标准(例如,Patrício 等人,2006 年)来证明修复决策的合理性,但事实证明这种习惯很难改变。这是我重温最初论点的好地方:环境法规提供了在相对较小的问题上花费过多时间和金钱的动机、手段和机会。在 CSO 的例子中,在不太严格、不太昂贵的控制方案下,环境风险本来是微乎其微的,但我们还是花了 30 年时间和数亿美元来解决这些问题。补救措施无法消除环境中的有毒和重点污染物,更不用说 CECs 了,但我们却一直将补救措施作为解决污染的办法。因此,我们不仅有污染问题,还有激励问题。环境合规行业赖以生存的激励结构存在缺陷,要解决这个问题,就必须进行监管改革。注意,不是激进的改革,而是明智的改革。仅仅这一简单的修改,就能引发我们对污染问题思考方式的深刻变化。它将使污染问题与人类社会产生的无数其他问题和机遇处于更加平等的地位。为什么?因为它将把化学品暴露与有意义的影响联系起来,而这些影响应该成为法律法规的基础:具体来说,就是可衡量的人口健康结果和清晰易懂的生态保护目标。我猜想,大多数 IEAM 读者都认为自己是环境毒理学家、化学家或风险评估师,这些职业的重点是控制有毒化学品的暴露。显然,这种关注的范围比全球可持续发展要窄。可能不太清楚的是,只关注或主要关注控制有毒化学品暴露并不一定符合 2030 年可持续发展议程。环境毒理学家、化学家和风险评估师可以为实现可持续发展目标(尤其是可持续发展目标 3 和 6)做出贡献,但除非我们能够接受我们的专业实践中存在的监管缺陷,否则实现这些可持续发展目标的任何进展都将过于昂贵和缓慢。我们正忙于执行监管任务,这些任务最多只能逐步降低环境介质中的污染物浓度。生态系统服务方面的任何收益都是偶然的,因为生态系统服务并不是补救决策中的一个因素。公共健康方面的收益可能会实现,但补救措施是基于假设的暴露假设,夸大了真正的公共健康收益。因此,让我们宽宏大量一点,把实现类似 2030 年议程的最后期限推迟到 2050 年。想想自 2000 年以来的四分之一个世纪里,我们在环境方面取得的进展。如果我们着手完成这项任务,我们能否以足够快的速度重新制定法规,为在下一个四分之一世纪实现联合国的目标做出有意义的贡献?尽管我愤世嫉俗,但我的答案是肯定的。需要做什么呢?环境科学专业必须重组。除产品注册和安全领域外,危害评估将不再受到重视,因为这两个领域受到的干扰要小于污染控制和修复专业。人口和社区层面的生态评估终点将成为我们分析的核心。 补偿性缓解措施将成为一项主要的合规措施,其使用范围将超出目前在湿地损失许可中的使用范围。Engineering With Nature®--美国陆军工程兵部队 (USACE) 的一项计划,旨在通过合作,有意识地协调自然与工程过程,从而高效、可持续地实现经济、环境和社会效益,以及其他类似计划(如 https://www.ecoshape.org/en/)--将迅速推广。系统生态学、保护生物学、林业和其他农业科学、经济学的多个分支(如工程、自然资源和政治经济学)、地理学、社会人类学、应用统计学、决策理论以及其他专业也将迅速推广、系统生态学、保护生物学、林业和其他农业科学、多个经济学分支(如工程学、自然资源和政治经济学)、地理学、社会人类学、应用统计学、决策理论和其他专业将与毒理学、化学、化学归宿建模和风险评估并驾齐驱,成为监管和其他决策系统的重要基础,并将关注的压力源扩展到化学物质之外。在严格设计、执行和分析的实地研究支持下,真正的适应性管理(Walters,1986 年)将成为常规做法。经过精心设计和审查的实验所导致的失败,如果得到适当的调整,可以被视为成功。许多律师和政策分析师可以找到工作,制定奖励抗灾能力和创新的规则和条例,使科学家和工程师能够对重大问题的创造性解决方案进行大规模、安全的失败现场试验。大学和学院可以扩大办学规模,环保公司也会欢迎大量新的专业人士加入。如果社会真正致力于在 2050 年前实现某种程度的 2030 年议程,那么我们的专业将会发生深刻而令人兴奋的变化,因为工作不仅在数量上,而且在意义和重要性上都将得到扩展。机会将是无穷无尽的。我们是否准备好迎接挑战?
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来源期刊
Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management
Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCESTOXICOLOGY&nbs-TOXICOLOGY
CiteScore
5.90
自引率
6.50%
发文量
156
期刊介绍: Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management (IEAM) publishes the science underpinning environmental decision making and problem solving. Papers submitted to IEAM must link science and technical innovations to vexing regional or global environmental issues in one or more of the following core areas: Science-informed regulation, policy, and decision making Health and ecological risk and impact assessment Restoration and management of damaged ecosystems Sustaining ecosystems Managing large-scale environmental change Papers published in these broad fields of study are connected by an array of interdisciplinary engineering, management, and scientific themes, which collectively reflect the interconnectedness of the scientific, social, and environmental challenges facing our modern global society: Methods for environmental quality assessment; forecasting across a number of ecosystem uses and challenges (systems-based, cost-benefit, ecosystem services, etc.); measuring or predicting ecosystem change and adaptation Approaches that connect policy and management tools; harmonize national and international environmental regulation; merge human well-being with ecological management; develop and sustain the function of ecosystems; conceptualize, model and apply concepts of spatial and regional sustainability Assessment and management frameworks that incorporate conservation, life cycle, restoration, and sustainability; considerations for climate-induced adaptation, change and consequences, and vulnerability Environmental management applications using risk-based approaches; considerations for protecting and fostering biodiversity, as well as enhancement or protection of ecosystem services and resiliency.
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