Research on the diffusion and control of unsafe behaviors among chemical industry park enterprises based on the SEIR evolutionary game model

IF 3.6 3区 工程技术 Q2 ENGINEERING, CHEMICAL
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In order to control the diffusion of unsafe behaviors among chemical industrial park enterprises, a Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) evolutionary game model is constructed based on the theory of epidemiology and evolutionary game theory. By exploring the game relationship between emergency management departments and safety assessment agencies, the paper analyzes the diffusion paths and evolutionary patterns of unsafe behaviors in chemical industrial park enterprises under different behavioral strategies adopted by both parties. Furthermore, it examines the process and patterns of system evolution to a positive stable state, and conducts multi-scenario simulation and analysis. The results indicate that the interactive behaviors of "strict regulation" by emergency management departments and "high-quality safety assessment" by safety assessment agencies are more conducive to controlling the diffusion of unsafe behaviors among chemical industrial park enterprises. Improving the efficiency of emergency management departments, establishing an attractive and constraining reward and punishment system to guide safety assessment agencies in conducting high-quality safety assessments, and stimulating the initiative of chemical industrial park enterprises in safety behaviors will be more conducive to forming an integrated, coordinated, and mutually constraining mechanism for work safety governance.
基于 SEIR 演化博弈模型的化工园区企业不安全行为扩散与控制研究
为了控制化工园区企业不安全行为的扩散,本文基于流行病学理论和进化博弈论,构建了易感-暴露-感染-恢复(SEIR)进化博弈模型。本文通过探讨应急管理部门与安全评估机构之间的博弈关系,分析了在双方采取不同行为策略的情况下,化工园区企业不安全行为的扩散路径和演化模式。此外,本文还研究了系统向正向稳定状态演化的过程和模式,并进行了多情景模拟和分析。结果表明,应急管理部门的 "严格监管 "和安全评估机构的 "高质量安全评估 "的互动行为更有利于控制化工园区企业不安全行为的扩散。提高应急管理部门的工作效率,建立具有吸引力和约束性的奖惩制度,引导安全评估机构开展高质量的安全评估,激发化工园区企业安全行为的主动性,将更有利于形成统筹协调、相互制约的安全生产治理机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.20
自引率
14.30%
发文量
226
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The broad scope of the journal is process safety. Process safety is defined as the prevention and mitigation of process-related injuries and damage arising from process incidents involving fire, explosion and toxic release. Such undesired events occur in the process industries during the use, storage, manufacture, handling, and transportation of highly hazardous chemicals.
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