{"title":"The formation of social groups under status concern","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105924","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study the interaction of two forces in the formation of social groups: the preference for high quality peers and the desire for status among one's peers. I examine their equilibrium effects under different market structures and find that status concern reduces the potential for and benefit of sorting - both for a social planner and a monopolist - but the interaction between preference for quality and status can make the exclusion of some agents a second-best outcome. Even in settings with complementarities, price discrimination and screening can be necessary to facilitate sorting and increase welfare. Nevertheless, positional concerns can be beneficial for welfare if they provide sufficient incentive to engage more with one's group and thus increase positive spillovers. In those cases, welfare is higher if individuals have at least some degree of status concern, even if the welfare measure ignores such relative comparisons.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124001303","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I study the interaction of two forces in the formation of social groups: the preference for high quality peers and the desire for status among one's peers. I examine their equilibrium effects under different market structures and find that status concern reduces the potential for and benefit of sorting - both for a social planner and a monopolist - but the interaction between preference for quality and status can make the exclusion of some agents a second-best outcome. Even in settings with complementarities, price discrimination and screening can be necessary to facilitate sorting and increase welfare. Nevertheless, positional concerns can be beneficial for welfare if they provide sufficient incentive to engage more with one's group and thus increase positive spillovers. In those cases, welfare is higher if individuals have at least some degree of status concern, even if the welfare measure ignores such relative comparisons.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.