Green electricity product menu design for retailers without knowing consumer environmental awareness

IF 13.6 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Energy Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-24 DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107928

Yanni Jiang , Debin Fang , Leyao Lei

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Adverse selection problem due to asymmetry of consumer environmental awareness (CEA) could reduce electricity retailer's profit and obstructs renewable energy (RE) consumption. This study analyzes mechanism design problem of retailer constricted by RE consumption quota to incentive consumers display true CEA in competitive retail market. Based on principal-agent theory, we develop an extended principal-agent model with the addition of an RE consumption quota constraint to design a green electricity product menu which includes the green level, the price and electric quantity. Influence of information symmetry and quota setting on product attributes, retailer's profit, consumer utility, RE consumption is analyzed, and results show that: (1) Compare to symmetric information, under asymmetric information, green level of product provided to consumers with CEA (denoted as C1) distorts upward, information rent is greater than zero when quota is large, while green level of product provided to consumers without CEA (denoted as C2) distorts downward, with no information rent. (2) Under asymmetric information, unit environmental premium (UEP) of green electricity positively relates to proportion of C1, CEA level, and incremental WTP, and reaches the maximum value at a certain quota. (3) Under asymmetric information, retailer's profit and RE consumption positively relates to proportion of C1, and CEA level. (4) Under asymmetric information, quota difference could contribute to improve retail service quality under competitive retail market, and RE consumption elevation.

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在不了解消费者环保意识的情况下，为零售商设计绿色电力产品菜单

消费者环境意识（CEA）不对称导致的逆向选择问题会降低电力零售商的利润，阻碍可再生能源（RE）消费。本研究分析了零售商受可再生能源消费配额限制的机制设计问题，以激励消费者在竞争性零售市场中展现真正的 CEA。基于委托代理理论，我们建立了一个扩展的委托代理模型，并加入了可再生能源消费配额约束，以设计一个包括绿色水平、价格和电量在内的绿色电力产品菜单。分析了信息对称和配额设置对产品属性、零售商利润、消费者效用、可再生能源消费的影响，结果表明(1）与信息对称相比，在信息不对称条件下，当配额较大时，提供给有 CEA 消费者的产品绿色水平（记为 C1）向上扭曲，信息租金大于零，而提供给无 CEA 消费者的产品绿色水平（记为 C2）向下扭曲，没有信息租金。(2）在信息不对称条件下，绿色电力的单位环境溢价（UEP）与 C1 比例、CEA 水平和增量 WTP 正相关，并在一定配额下达到最大值。(3) 在信息不对称的情况下，零售商的利润和可再生能源消费量与 C1 比例和 CEA 水平正相关。(4) 在信息不对称的情况下，配额差异有助于提高竞争性零售市场的零售服务质量和可再生能源消费量。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Energy Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

12.50%

发文量

524

期刊介绍： Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.