Freedom in the Many-Worlds Interpretation

IF 1.2 3区物理与天体物理 Q3 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Foundations of Physics Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI:10.1007/s10701-024-00802-5

Ovidiu Cristinel Stoica

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I analyze the possibility of free-will in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), arguing for their compatibility. I use as a starting point Nicolas Gisin’s “The Multiverse Pandemic” (preprint arXiv:2210.05377, 2022, after Gisin, N., “L’épidémie du multivers”, in “Le Plus Grand des Hasards”, Belin, Paris, 2010), in which he makes an interesting case that MWI is contradicted by our hard to deny free-will. The counts he raised are: (1) MWI is deterministic, forcing choices on us, (2) in MWI all our possible choices happen, and (3) MWI limits creativity, because everything is entangled with everything else. I argue that each of these features of MWI is in fact compatible with more freedom than it may seem. In particular, MWI allows compatibilist free-will, but also free-will very much like the libertarian free-will defined by Chisholm. I argue that the position that alternative choices exist as possibilities does not make sense from a physical point of view, but MWI offers a physical ground for alternatives.

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多世界诠释中的自由

我分析了多世界解释（MWI）中自由意志的可能性，论证了它们之间的兼容性。我以尼古拉斯-吉辛（Nicolas Gisin）的《多重宇宙大流行》（preprint arXiv:2210.05377, 2022, after Gisin, N., "L'épidémie du multivers", in "Le Plus Grand des Hasards", Belin, Paris, 2010）为起点，在这篇文章中，他提出了一个有趣的观点，即多重宇宙解释与我们难以否认的自由意志相矛盾。他提出的理由如下(1)《世界记忆》是决定论的，迫使我们做出选择；(2)在《世界记忆》中，我们所有可能的选择都会发生；(3)《世界记忆》限制了创造力，因为万事万物都与其他事物纠缠在一起。我的论点是，事实上，最低限度世界投资的每一个特点都能带来比表面看起来更多的自由。特别是，最低限度自由允许兼容自由意志，也允许与奇肖姆定义的自由主义自由意志非常相似的自由意志。我认为，从物理学的角度来看，替代选择作为可能性存在的立场是不合理的，但多边主义为替代选择提供了物理基础。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Foundations of Physics 物理-物理：综合

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

6.70%

发文量

104

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： The conceptual foundations of physics have been under constant revision from the outset, and remain so today. Discussion of foundational issues has always been a major source of progress in science, on a par with empirical knowledge and mathematics. Examples include the debates on the nature of space and time involving Newton and later Einstein; on the nature of heat and of energy; on irreversibility and probability due to Boltzmann; on the nature of matter and observation measurement during the early days of quantum theory; on the meaning of renormalisation, and many others. Today, insightful reflection on the conceptual structure utilised in our efforts to understand the physical world is of particular value, given the serious unsolved problems that are likely to demand, once again, modifications of the grammar of our scientific description of the physical world. The quantum properties of gravity, the nature of measurement in quantum mechanics, the primary source of irreversibility, the role of information in physics – all these are examples of questions about which science is still confused and whose solution may well demand more than skilled mathematics and new experiments. Foundations of Physics is a privileged forum for discussing such foundational issues, open to physicists, cosmologists, philosophers and mathematicians. It is devoted to the conceptual bases of the fundamental theories of physics and cosmology, to their logical, methodological, and philosophical premises. The journal welcomes papers on issues such as the foundations of special and general relativity, quantum theory, classical and quantum field theory, quantum gravity, unified theories, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, cosmology, and similar.