{"title":"Ravens and Strawberries: Remarks on Hempel’s and Ramsey’s Accounts of laws and scientific explanation","authors":"Caterina Sisti","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00605-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Hempel never met Ramsey, but he knew his work. In his 1958 <i>The Theoretician’s Dilemma: a study in the logic of theory construction</i>, Hempel introduces the term <i>Ramsey sentence</i>, referring to Ramsey’s attempt in <i>Theories</i> to get rid of theoretical terms in formal accounts of scientific theories. In this paper, I draw the attention to another connection between Ramsey’s and Hempel’s works. Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological (DN) account of scientific explanation resembles very closely Ramsey’s account of a certain type of conditional sentences. In the first part of the paper, by introducing a fictional story, I highlight the similarities and differences between the two. In the last part of the paper, I claim that the most relevant difference between Ramsey and Hempel can be used to offer original solutions to Hempel’s Raven Paradox. Two possibilities are presented, arguing that the second, which requires a reconsideration of the formalisation of laws, is the most promising.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00605-5","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Hempel never met Ramsey, but he knew his work. In his 1958 The Theoretician’s Dilemma: a study in the logic of theory construction, Hempel introduces the term Ramsey sentence, referring to Ramsey’s attempt in Theories to get rid of theoretical terms in formal accounts of scientific theories. In this paper, I draw the attention to another connection between Ramsey’s and Hempel’s works. Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological (DN) account of scientific explanation resembles very closely Ramsey’s account of a certain type of conditional sentences. In the first part of the paper, by introducing a fictional story, I highlight the similarities and differences between the two. In the last part of the paper, I claim that the most relevant difference between Ramsey and Hempel can be used to offer original solutions to Hempel’s Raven Paradox. Two possibilities are presented, arguing that the second, which requires a reconsideration of the formalisation of laws, is the most promising.
亨普尔从未见过拉姆齐，但他知道他的作品。亨普尔在 1958 年出版的《理论家的困境：理论建构逻辑研究》（Theoretician's Dilemma: a study in the logic of theory construction）中提出了拉姆齐句子（Ramsey sentence）一词，指的是拉姆齐在《理论》（Theories）一书中试图在科学理论的形式化叙述中摆脱理论术语。在本文中，我提请读者注意拉姆齐与亨普尔著作之间的另一种联系。亨普尔关于科学解释的演绎-名论（DN）论述与拉姆齐关于某类条件句的论述非常相似。在本文的第一部分，我通过介绍一个虚构的故事，强调了两者之间的异同。在本文的最后一部分，我声称拉姆齐与亨普尔之间最相关的差异可以用来为亨普尔的乌鸦悖论提供独创的解决方案。本文提出了两种可能性，并认为第二种可能性最有希望，它需要重新考虑定律的形式化。
期刊介绍：
The European Journal for Philosophy of Science publishes groundbreaking works that can deepen understanding of the concepts and methods of the sciences, as they explore increasingly many facets of the world we live in. It is of direct interest to philosophers of science coming from different perspectives, as well as scientists, citizens and policymakers. The journal is interested in articles from all traditions and all backgrounds, as long as they engage with the sciences in a constructive, and critical, way. The journal represents the various longstanding European philosophical traditions engaging with the sciences, but welcomes articles from every part of the world.
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