Third party interventions promote cooperation on the interdependent networks: A perspective based on prospect theory.

Abstract

Third-party intervention is a beneficial means to alleviate conflicts and promote cooperation among disputants. The decision-making of disputants is closely related to the intensity of the impact of third-party intervention on their profits. Actually, disputants often decide whether to adopt cooperative strategies based on their own perceived rather than actual gains or losses brought about by third-party intervention. We, therefore, introduce prospect theory to explore the formation and maintenance of cooperation in a system composed of third parties and disputants, which, respectively, constitute two sub-networks of the interdependent networks. Both interveners and disputants participate in a prisoner's dilemma game, and the third-party intervener will pay a certain price to impose certain punishments on the defectors of the disputed layer. The simulation results show that the introduction of third-party intervention based on the prospect theory alleviates the conflicts in the dispute layer and promotes cooperation among disputants, which indicates that third parties such as governments or organizations should appropriately consider the risk attitudes of disputants when mediating their conflicts. The level of cooperation at the dispute layer is inversely proportional to the intervention cost and directly proportional to the intervention intensity. Our research may shed some new light on the study of the evolution of cooperation under third-party intervention.