{"title":"The Substance View and Cases of Complicated Multifetal Pregnancy.","authors":"P Singh","doi":"10.1007/s11673-024-10385-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I consider cases of multifetal pregnancy in which one fetus with a fatal birth defect poses a risk to the survival of another healthy fetus to show that the substance view anti-abortion position leads to a contradiction. In cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy, if intervention by selective abortion to terminate the defective fetus is not performed, both fetuses will die due to the conditions created by the defective fetus's fatal birth defect. Because abortion is wrong on the anti-abortion position, and a moderate anti-abortion position cannot make an exception for selective abortion in cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy if it operates on the substance view, choosing selective abortion must be wrong, so one must let both fetuses die. However, the substance view anti-abortion position must take letting both fetuses die to be wrong, otherwise it will undermine itself as an anti-abortion position. Further, the substance view provides grounds for why letting fetuses die would be wrong anyway. Thus, the substance view anti-abortion position must take both having an abortion and not having an abortion to be wrong, which is a contradiction. Therefore, cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy show that the substance view anti-abortion position is false.</p>","PeriodicalId":50252,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Bioethical Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Bioethical Inquiry","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-024-10385-5","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I consider cases of multifetal pregnancy in which one fetus with a fatal birth defect poses a risk to the survival of another healthy fetus to show that the substance view anti-abortion position leads to a contradiction. In cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy, if intervention by selective abortion to terminate the defective fetus is not performed, both fetuses will die due to the conditions created by the defective fetus's fatal birth defect. Because abortion is wrong on the anti-abortion position, and a moderate anti-abortion position cannot make an exception for selective abortion in cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy if it operates on the substance view, choosing selective abortion must be wrong, so one must let both fetuses die. However, the substance view anti-abortion position must take letting both fetuses die to be wrong, otherwise it will undermine itself as an anti-abortion position. Further, the substance view provides grounds for why letting fetuses die would be wrong anyway. Thus, the substance view anti-abortion position must take both having an abortion and not having an abortion to be wrong, which is a contradiction. Therefore, cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy show that the substance view anti-abortion position is false.
期刊介绍:
The JBI welcomes both reports of empirical research and articles that increase theoretical understanding of medicine and health care, the health professions and the biological sciences. The JBI is also open to critical reflections on medicine and conventional bioethics, the nature of health, illness and disability, the sources of ethics, the nature of ethical communities, and possible implications of new developments in science and technology for social and cultural life and human identity. We welcome contributions from perspectives that are less commonly published in existing journals in the field and reports of empirical research studies using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies.
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