Abortion Ban Advocates and Rape Exception.

Abstract

The present paper argues that abortion ban advocates can justify an exception for rape. Recently, Blackshaw offered an interesting argument that if abortion ban advocates modified their position along the lines of Thomson's analysis of rights, they could make an exception for rape. However, doing so would require making concessions they would be unlikely to make, the crucial one being subscribing to an absurd view that abortion in the case of rape is permissible but only if it is performed in a certain way, that is, in a way that withdraws life support from the fetus. Agreeing first with Blackshaw's premises, we argue that the view in question is hardly absurd. Thus, relying on Boonin's acknowledgment that although very rare, a position according to which abortion should be legal but only if it is performed in a way that lets the fetus die rather than kills it is a possible position, we argue, first, that it is Blackshaw's position that is inconsistent, second, that since deontology sees permissibility of a given result as path-dependent, deontologically oriented abortion ban advocates should find the view in question appealing rather than absurd and, third, that although there are indeed scenarios in which withdrawing life support is morally equivalent to killing, extraction abortions in the case of rape are not amongst them. Since in the case of rape the fetus is not entitled to life support, extraction abortions are better classified as permissible non-omissive allowings than impermissible killings. Thus, there is nothing absurd in the view that abortion in the case of rape is permissible but only if it is performed in a certain way. Accordingly, adopting this view does not seem to be much of a concession for abortion ban advocates who can therefore make an exception for rape.