Yves Steinebach, Markus Hinterleitner, Xavier Fernández‐i‐Marín
{"title":"Regulatory offsetting in advanced democracies","authors":"Yves Steinebach, Markus Hinterleitner, Xavier Fernández‐i‐Marín","doi":"10.1111/puar.13887","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so‐called “regulatory offsetting schemes,” requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth.","PeriodicalId":48431,"journal":{"name":"Public Administration Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Public Administration Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13887","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so‐called “regulatory offsetting schemes,” requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth.
期刊介绍:
Public Administration Review (PAR), a bi-monthly professional journal, has held its position as the premier outlet for public administration research, theory, and practice for 75 years. Published for the American Society for Public Administration,TM/SM, it uniquely serves both academics and practitioners in the public sector. PAR features articles that identify and analyze current trends, offer a factual basis for decision-making, stimulate discussion, and present leading literature in an easily accessible format. Covering a diverse range of topics and featuring expert book reviews, PAR is both exciting to read and an indispensable resource in the field.