Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric rewards

Abstract

Rewards, as a form of positive reinforcement, effectively encourage cooperation. In this paper, we study a multi-population prisoner's dilemma game with asymmetric rewards, where agents in the same population play prisoner's dilemma game, and agents from the giver population can reward agents from the recipient population only if they make the same choice. In well-mixed populations, asymmetric rewards can facilitate cooperation. Similarly, asymmetric rewards on the regular square lattice can effectively prevent complete defection. In both well-mixed and structured populations, seemingly disadvantageous cooperative givers play an important role in the maintenance and spread of cooperation. Especially on lattice, cooperative givers with asymmetric rewards can be active in the system through diverse cases of cyclic dominance. Our findings provide deeper insights into the impact of asymmetry on cooperative behavior and the development of altruistic behavior in real-world scenarios.