{"title":"Green subsidy Strategies and fairness concern in a Capital-Constrained supply chain","authors":"Huamin Wu , Jiaxiang Weng , Guo Li , Hong Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.tre.2024.103693","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study investigates a decentralized capital-constrained green supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained manufacturer and a retailer, wherein the manufacturer is dependent on the retailer by funding his operations and invests in green technology development to manufacture green products. To enhance the degree of product greening, the retailer may launch a subsidy to incentivize the manufacturer. We specifically consider three widely adopted green subsidy strategies by the retailer, namely, price-increasing strategy (Strategy PI), interest-reducing strategy (Strategy IR), and cost-sharing strategy (Strategy CS). Our results reveal that the preferred strategy for the retailer and manufacturer is either Strategy CS or IR, while Strategy PI cannot be the dominant strategy. In specific, when the interest-reducing proportion is low, both the manufacturer and retailer prefer Strategy CS; otherwise, Strategy IR will be preferred by both the retailer and manufacturer. Our study further studies the scenario in which the retailer has a fairness concern. The results indicate that such a concern can weaken the manufacturer’s incentive to improve the degree of product greening and strengthen the retailer’s incentive to embrace Strategy CS. More interestingly, the fairness concern can enhance the performance of the entire supply chain under certain conditions. Specifically, when the level of fairness concern is low, fairness concern is detrimental to the entire supply chain. However, when the level of fairness concern is high, fairness concern is beneficial for the entire supply chain.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49418,"journal":{"name":"Transportation Research Part E-Logistics and Transportation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Transportation Research Part E-Logistics and Transportation Review","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554524002849","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study investigates a decentralized capital-constrained green supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained manufacturer and a retailer, wherein the manufacturer is dependent on the retailer by funding his operations and invests in green technology development to manufacture green products. To enhance the degree of product greening, the retailer may launch a subsidy to incentivize the manufacturer. We specifically consider three widely adopted green subsidy strategies by the retailer, namely, price-increasing strategy (Strategy PI), interest-reducing strategy (Strategy IR), and cost-sharing strategy (Strategy CS). Our results reveal that the preferred strategy for the retailer and manufacturer is either Strategy CS or IR, while Strategy PI cannot be the dominant strategy. In specific, when the interest-reducing proportion is low, both the manufacturer and retailer prefer Strategy CS; otherwise, Strategy IR will be preferred by both the retailer and manufacturer. Our study further studies the scenario in which the retailer has a fairness concern. The results indicate that such a concern can weaken the manufacturer’s incentive to improve the degree of product greening and strengthen the retailer’s incentive to embrace Strategy CS. More interestingly, the fairness concern can enhance the performance of the entire supply chain under certain conditions. Specifically, when the level of fairness concern is low, fairness concern is detrimental to the entire supply chain. However, when the level of fairness concern is high, fairness concern is beneficial for the entire supply chain.
本研究探讨了一个由资本受限的制造商和零售商组成的分散资本受限绿色供应链,其中制造商依赖零售商为其运营提供资金,并投资于绿色技术开发以生产绿色产品。为了提高产品的绿色程度,零售商可以推出补贴来激励制造商。我们特别考虑了零售商广泛采用的三种绿色补贴策略,即提价策略(PI)、减息策略(IR)和成本分摊策略(CS)。我们的研究结果表明,零售商和制造商的首选策略是 CS 策略或 IR 策略,而 PI 策略并不能成为主导策略。具体来说,当减息比例较低时,制造商和零售商都会选择 CS 策略;反之,零售商和制造商都会选择 IR 策略。我们的研究还进一步研究了零售商有公平顾虑的情况。结果表明,这种顾虑会削弱制造商提高产品绿色化程度的动力,增强零售商采用 CS 战略的动力。更有趣的是,在某些条件下,公平顾虑可以提高整个供应链的绩效。具体来说,当公平性关注水平较低时,公平性关注对整个供应链不利。然而,当公平关切水平较高时,公平关切对整个供应链有利。
期刊介绍:
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is a reputable journal that publishes high-quality articles covering a wide range of topics in the field of logistics and transportation research. The journal welcomes submissions on various subjects, including transport economics, transport infrastructure and investment appraisal, evaluation of public policies related to transportation, empirical and analytical studies of logistics management practices and performance, logistics and operations models, and logistics and supply chain management.
Part E aims to provide informative and well-researched articles that contribute to the understanding and advancement of the field. The content of the journal is complementary to other prestigious journals in transportation research, such as Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Part B: Methodological, Part C: Emerging Technologies, Part D: Transport and Environment, and Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. Together, these journals form a comprehensive and cohesive reference for current research in transportation science.