Akash R. Wasil, Peter Barnett, Michael Gerovitch, Roman Hauksson, Tom Reed, Jack William Miller
{"title":"Governing dual-use technologies: Case studies of international security agreements and lessons for AI governance","authors":"Akash R. Wasil, Peter Barnett, Michael Gerovitch, Roman Hauksson, Tom Reed, Jack William Miller","doi":"arxiv-2409.02779","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"International AI governance agreements and institutions may play an important\nrole in reducing global security risks from advanced AI. To inform the design\nof such agreements and institutions, we conducted case studies of historical\nand contemporary international security agreements. We focused specifically on\nthose arrangements around dual-use technologies, examining agreements in\nnuclear security, chemical weapons, biosecurity, and export controls. For each\nagreement, we examined four key areas: (a) purpose, (b) core powers, (c)\ngovernance structure, and (d) instances of non-compliance. From these case\nstudies, we extracted lessons for the design of international AI agreements and\ngovernance institutions. We discuss the importance of robust verification\nmethods, strategies for balancing power between nations, mechanisms for\nadapting to rapid technological change, approaches to managing trade-offs\nbetween transparency and security, incentives for participation, and effective\nenforcement mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":501112,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computers and Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computers and Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.02779","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
International AI governance agreements and institutions may play an important
role in reducing global security risks from advanced AI. To inform the design
of such agreements and institutions, we conducted case studies of historical
and contemporary international security agreements. We focused specifically on
those arrangements around dual-use technologies, examining agreements in
nuclear security, chemical weapons, biosecurity, and export controls. For each
agreement, we examined four key areas: (a) purpose, (b) core powers, (c)
governance structure, and (d) instances of non-compliance. From these case
studies, we extracted lessons for the design of international AI agreements and
governance institutions. We discuss the importance of robust verification
methods, strategies for balancing power between nations, mechanisms for
adapting to rapid technological change, approaches to managing trade-offs
between transparency and security, incentives for participation, and effective
enforcement mechanisms.