Mergers and Acquisitions, CEO Compensation, and Corporate Governance in the Hospitality and Tourism Industry

IF 3.4 4区管理学 Q1 HOSPITALITY, LEISURE, SPORT & TOURISM

Cornell Hospitality Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-09-10 DOI:10.1177/19389655241271398

Yuan Li, Manisha Singal

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Abstract

Drawing on agency theory, we explore the relationship between mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in the hospitality and tourism (HT) industry. Specifically, we investigate whether growth via acquisitions, a popular strategy in the HT industry, is influenced by CEO compensation. Using a sample of HT and non-HT firms for comparison from 1992 to 2019, we find that CEO compensation is significantly higher after acquisitions for both HT and non-HT firms. However, when controlling for common compensation determinants, CEO compensation is significantly higher in HT firms but not in non-HT firms. Surprisingly, in our sample, corporate governance is not significantly related to changes in CEO compensation post-acquisition. In addition, while the fraction of cash-based compensation is negatively related to M&A propensity in both HT and non-HT firms, the fraction of equity-based compensation is unrelated to M&A propensity in HT firms. Our study fills an important gap in the sparse literature on the link between M&A and CEO compensation in the HT industry, providing theoretical implications for future research and managerial implications for boards of directors to design compensation plans that align the interests of managers and shareholders.

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酒店与旅游业的并购、首席执行官薪酬和公司治理

根据代理理论，我们探讨了酒店和旅游业（HT）中的并购（M&As）与首席执行官（CEO）薪酬之间的关系。具体而言，我们研究了酒店和旅游业中流行的并购战略是否会影响首席执行官的薪酬。通过对 1992 年至 2019 年酒店与旅游业企业和非酒店与旅游业企业的样本进行比较，我们发现酒店与旅游业企业和非酒店与旅游业企业的 CEO 薪酬在并购后都显著提高。然而，在控制了共同的薪酬决定因素后，HT 企业的 CEO 薪酬明显高于非 HT 企业。令人惊讶的是，在我们的样本中，公司治理与收购后首席执行官薪酬的变化没有显著关系。此外，在高增长公司和非高增长公司中，基于现金的薪酬比例与并购倾向呈负相关，而在高增长公司中，基于股票的薪酬比例与并购倾向无关。我们的研究填补了有关高温行业 M&A 与首席执行官薪酬之间联系的稀少文献中的一个重要空白，为未来研究提供了理论依据，并为董事会设计能使经理人和股东利益一致的薪酬计划提供了管理启示。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Cornell Hospitality Quarterly Multiple-

CiteScore

8.50

自引率

2.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： Cornell Hospitality Quarterly (CQ) publishes research in all business disciplines that contribute to management practice in the hospitality and tourism industries. Like the hospitality industry itself, the editorial content of CQ is broad, including topics in strategic management, consumer behavior, marketing, financial management, real-estate, accounting, operations management, planning and design, human resources management, applied economics, information technology, international development, communications, travel and tourism, and more general management. The audience is academics, hospitality managers, developers, consultants, investors, and students.