Contract preference of an online intermediary in the presence of online reviews and cross-channel spillover

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-15 DOI:10.1002/mde.4320

Yang Tong, Yina Li, Fei Ye, Ajay Kumar, Kim Hua Tan

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In e-commerce, online intermediaries give suppliers ready access to consumers and have thereby become an important distribution channel. They can operate as resellers (under a reselling contract) or marketplaces (under an agency contract) for suppliers. This study analyzes the most effective contract arrangement between an online intermediary and two competing suppliers. The suppliers receive online reviews of their products and also be affected by the spillover effect of the intermediary's channel on their own direct sales channels. The intermediary can offer a reselling contract to one supplier and an agency contract to the other or offer the same contract type to both suppliers. We find that when the cross-channel spillover is positive or only moderately negative, the intermediary offers different contract types if the difference in the review ratings of the two suppliers' products is considerable; otherwise, a reselling contract is offered to both. However, when the cross-channel spillover is highly negative, the intermediary may offer an agency contract to both suppliers. Our research provides practical guidance for intermediaries on the most effective contract strategies to use when collaborating with suppliers who receive varied online reviews, depending on the cross-channel spillover scenarios.

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存在在线评论和跨渠道溢出效应时在线中介的合同偏好

在电子商务中，在线中介为供应商提供了接触消费者的便利，因而成为一个重要的分销渠道。它们可以作为供应商的转售商（根据转售合同）或市场（根据代理合同）开展业务。本研究分析了一家在线中介机构与两家相互竞争的供应商之间最有效的合同安排。供应商会收到对其产品的在线评论，同时也会受到中间商渠道对其自身直销渠道的溢出效应的影响。中间商可以向一家供应商提供转售合同，向另一家供应商提供代理合同，也可以向两家供应商提供相同类型的合同。我们发现，当跨渠道溢出效应为正或仅为中度负时，如果两家供应商产品的评论等级相差较大，中间商会提供不同的合同类型；否则，中间商会同时向两家供应商提供转售合同。然而，当跨渠道溢出效应非常负面时，中间商可能会向两家供应商提供代理合同。我们的研究为中间商提供了实用指导，帮助他们在与获得不同在线评论的供应商合作时，根据跨渠道溢出情况选择最有效的合同策略。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.