Investment in fuel-consumption reduction technologies in a vehicle supply chain under different subsidy policies: A dynamic framework

IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Yongxi Yi, Meng Zhang, Yuqiong Li, Chunyan Fu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

It develops a differential game model of a fuel car supply chain in which consumers' low fuel consumption, green preferences, and government subsidies promote manufacturers' investment in fuel-consumption reduction technologies (FCRT); the price, the fuel consumption per mile, and the retailer's marketing efforts jointly determine the demand for the product. There are four game scenarios constituted by ex ante or ex post government that subsidizes and shares or does not share marketing costs. The results show that ex ante and ex post subsidies can incentivize investment in FCRT. However, the preferable subsidy model depends on the parameter values; the manufacturer-led marketing cost-sharing contract results in supply chain coordination.

不同补贴政策下汽车供应链中的油耗降低技术投资:动态框架
它建立了一个燃油汽车供应链的差分博弈模型,在该模型中,消费者的低油耗、绿色偏好和政府补贴促进了制造商对降低油耗技术(FCRT)的投资;价格、每英里油耗和零售商的营销努力共同决定了产品需求。有四种博弈情景,分别由事前或事后政府补贴、分担或不分担营销成本构成。结果表明,事前补贴和事后补贴都能激励对食品添加剂和污染物回收技术的投资。然而,哪种补贴模式更可取取决于参数值;制造商主导的营销成本分担合同可实现供应链协调。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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