The responsibility of setting a bad example: Models are blamed for their imitators’ behaviour

Abstract

Imitating each other is a central element of human nature and everyday life. Modelling – setting an example to others – and imitation – when the modelled behaviour is copied – are just as fundamental to learning as to maintaining and transmitting culture. Yet, the moral connotations of modelling and imitation are not well understood. Building on and extending the theoretical framework of vicarious responsibility, we investigate the imitated model's responsibility and the psychological processes underlying blame attribution to the model for their imitators’ behaviour. We argue that people understand that imitating a wrongdoing renders it potentially more consequential and that people account for these additional consequences in their appraisals of the original, modelled wrongdoing. Moreover, we hypothesized that models would be blamed for their imitators’ harmful behaviour to the extent that the observers copied the model's action. Five studies (Ntotal = 945) utilizing various contexts from animal mistreatment to online bullying, three of them preregistered, provide consistent support for our hypotheses and show that models are blamed for their imitators’ behaviour, that is, for setting a bad example for others. Extending present theories of vicarious responsibility, we demonstrate that shared group membership is not always a necessary requirement for vicarious blame attributions.