{"title":"Do e-cigarette retail licensure laws reduce youth tobacco use?","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102919","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>E-cigarette licensure laws (ELLs) require retailers to obtain a state license to sell e-cigarettes over the counter. This study is the first to comprehensively explore the effect of ELL adoption on youth tobacco product use. Using data from the State Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) and a difference-in-differences approach, we find no evidence that ELL adoption reduces youth ENDS use. The precision of our estimates allows us to rule out, with 95 % confidence, ELL-induced declines in prior-month, frequent, and everyday youth ENDS use of more than 0.7, 0.3, and 0.4 percentage points, respectively. The pattern of null findings persists when we examine ELLs that impose higher penalties for retailer non-compliance, higher renewable licensure fees, and criminal in addition to civil penalties. We conclude that ELLs have only limited success in curbing access to ENDS among youths.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Health Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016762962400064X","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
E-cigarette licensure laws (ELLs) require retailers to obtain a state license to sell e-cigarettes over the counter. This study is the first to comprehensively explore the effect of ELL adoption on youth tobacco product use. Using data from the State Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) and a difference-in-differences approach, we find no evidence that ELL adoption reduces youth ENDS use. The precision of our estimates allows us to rule out, with 95 % confidence, ELL-induced declines in prior-month, frequent, and everyday youth ENDS use of more than 0.7, 0.3, and 0.4 percentage points, respectively. The pattern of null findings persists when we examine ELLs that impose higher penalties for retailer non-compliance, higher renewable licensure fees, and criminal in addition to civil penalties. We conclude that ELLs have only limited success in curbing access to ENDS among youths.
期刊介绍:
This journal seeks articles related to the economics of health and medical care. Its scope will include the following topics:
Production and supply of health services;
Demand and utilization of health services;
Financing of health services;
Determinants of health, including investments in health and risky health behaviors;
Economic consequences of ill-health;
Behavioral models of demanders, suppliers and other health care agencies;
Evaluation of policy interventions that yield economic insights;
Efficiency and distributional aspects of health policy;
and such other topics as the Editors may deem appropriate.