A Stackelberg game theory-based optimal scheduling of active distribution system considering multi-stakeholders

IF 3.3 3区工程技术 Q2 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC

Electric Power Systems Research Pub Date : 2024-09-06 DOI:10.1016/j.epsr.2024.111024

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study addresses the limited research on energy storage operators as independent stakeholders in active distribution network scheduling involving multiple stakeholders. The study proposes a multi-agent Stackelberg Game Model where distribution network operators act as leaders, and energy storage operators and power users act as followers. A Bi-Level programming model is employed to solve the multi-agent game, and equilibrium strategies of each stakeholder are analyzed. Distribution network operators aims to maximize operational efficiency by formulating time-of-use price strategies, while energy storage operators and power users adjust their charging, discharging, and consumption strategies to maximize profits and minimize electricity costs. It emphasizes the importance of considering user satisfaction alongside economic costs when examining their electricity consumption. Simulation scenarios demonstrate that the proposed model enhances stakeholder benefits and societal welfare. Energy storage operators increase the depth of its own charging and discharging strategies in pursuit of maximizing benefits, resulting in a lower peak-valley transfer rate on load. Considering the interests of all stakeholders, the benefits of energy storage operators and power users are increased by 29.58 % and 20.07 % respectively, and the benefits of distribution grid companies are reduced by 18.97 %, but the total social profit is increased by 26.11 % while the cost of user satisfaction reduced by 43.78 %.© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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基于斯塔克尔伯格博弈论的主动配电系统优化调度（考虑多方利益相关者

在涉及多个利益相关者的主动配电网络调度中，储能运营商作为独立利益相关者的研究十分有限。研究提出了一个多代理斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型，其中配电网运营商充当领导者，储能运营商和电力用户充当追随者。采用双层编程模型求解多代理博弈，并分析了各利益相关者的均衡策略。配电网运营商通过制定分时电价策略来实现运营效率最大化，而储能运营商和电力用户则通过调整充电、放电和消费策略来实现利润最大化和电力成本最小化。它强调了在研究用户用电量时，在考虑经济成本的同时考虑用户满意度的重要性。模拟场景表明，所提出的模型提高了利益相关者的利益和社会福利。储能运营商为了追求利益最大化，增加了自身充放电策略的深度，从而降低了负载的峰谷转移率。考虑到所有利益相关者的利益，储能运营商和电力用户的收益分别增加了 29.58 % 和 20.07 %，配电网公司的收益减少了 18.97 %，但社会总利润增加了 26.11 %，用户满意度成本降低了 43.78 %。保留所有权利。

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来源期刊

Electric Power Systems Research 工程技术-工程：电子与电气

CiteScore

7.50

自引率

17.90%

发文量

963

审稿时长

3.8 months

期刊介绍： Electric Power Systems Research is an international medium for the publication of original papers concerned with the generation, transmission, distribution and utilization of electrical energy. The journal aims at presenting important results of work in this field, whether in the form of applied research, development of new procedures or components, orginal application of existing knowledge or new designapproaches. The scope of Electric Power Systems Research is broad, encompassing all aspects of electric power systems. The following list of topics is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to indicate topics that fall within the journal purview. • Generation techniques ranging from advances in conventional electromechanical methods, through nuclear power generation, to renewable energy generation. • Transmission, spanning the broad area from UHV (ac and dc) to network operation and protection, line routing and design. • Substation work: equipment design, protection and control systems. • Distribution techniques, equipment development, and smart grids. • The utilization area from energy efficiency to distributed load levelling techniques. • Systems studies including control techniques, planning, optimization methods, stability, security assessment and insulation coordination.