A Defense of the Obligation to Keep Promises to the Dead.

IF 1.3 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS
James Stacey Taylor
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

It is widely held that to break a promise that one made to a person who is now dead would be to wrong her. This view undergirds many positions in bioethics, ranging from those that concern who may access a person's medical records after she has died, to questions concerning organ procurement and posthumous procreation. Ashley Dressel has argued that there is no reason to believe that promissory obligations can be owed to people who are dead. Although her arguments are unsuccessful, others establish that neither of the promissory obligation accounts that she considers (the "Authority Account" and the "harm-based view") can justify the standard view that directed posthumous promissory obligation is possible. However, this does not mean that the received view that we should keep our promises to the dead is mistaken. First, the theoretical commitments and argumentative strategies of those who endorse the possibility of posthumous promissory obligations preclude them from grounding such on either of these accounts of directed promissory obligation. They are thus already committed to justifying such obligations in other ways. Second, the obligation to keep promises to the dead could be justified on the grounds that not to do so would adversely affect the living.

为履行对死者承诺的义务辩护。
人们普遍认为,违背对一个已经死去的人所做的承诺就是对不起她。这种观点是生命伦理学中许多立场的基础,从有关谁可以在一个人死后查阅其医疗记录的立场,到有关器官获取和死后生育的问题,不一而足。阿什利-德雷斯尔(Ashley Dressel)认为,没有理由相信对死亡的人负有承诺义务。虽然她的论证并不成功,但其他论证证实,她所考虑的两种许诺义务论证("权威论证 "和 "基于损害的观点")都不能证明标准观点是正确的,即有指示的死后许诺义务是可能的。然而,这并不意味着我们应该信守对死者承诺的观点是错误的。首先,那些认可死后允诺义务可能性的人的理论承诺和论证策略使他们无法将死后允诺义务建立在上述任何一种定向允诺义务的基础之上。因此,他们已经承诺以其他方式证明这种义务的正当性。其次,履行对死者承诺的义务的理由可以是,不履行承诺会对活着的人产生不利影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
6.20%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: This bimonthly publication explores the shared themes and concerns of philosophy and the medical sciences. Central issues in medical research and practice have important philosophical dimensions, for, in treating disease and promoting health, medicine involves presuppositions about human goals and values. Conversely, the concerns of philosophy often significantly relate to those of medicine, as philosophers seek to understand the nature of medical knowledge and the human condition in the modern world. In addition, recent developments in medical technology and treatment create moral problems that raise important philosophical questions. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims to provide an ongoing forum for the discussion of such themes and issues.
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