Procedural constraints and regulatory ossification in the US states

Abstract

Scholars of the US regulatory process routinely assert that rulemaking is “ossified”—that it has become so encumbered with procedural constraints that it is difficult for agencies to issue socially desirable regulations. Yet, this claim has rarely been subject to empirical testing, and this is particularly true at the sub‐federal (i.e., US state) level. But the same factors that allegedly cause ossification in federal agencies also exist in the states. Using original survey data from 1460 agency leaders from across all 50 states, we present evidence suggesting that state agencies issue numerous rules and appear to do so quickly. We then focus on the procedural constraints that supposedly drive ossification and present some of the first evidence questioning the argument at the state level. We conclude that fears about the supposed tendency of procedural oversight mechanisms on the ability to regulate may be exaggerated.