Beyond the target: The spillover effect of shareholder activism on corporate tax avoidance

Abstract

This study explores how shareholder activism affects the behaviors of non-target companies with the same investment portfolio. Employing a matching-DiD methodology, we find that the portfolio non-target treatment firms tend to conduct greater tax avoidance compared to the control firms. This effect is stronger for firms facing financial constraints, under experienced activist scrutiny, involved in hostile campaigns, targeting financial and M&A matters, and with higher activist shareholdings. Increased tax avoidance is attributed to improved tax planning, enhancing firm value, and reducing future targeting risks. These findings align with the threat effect, where both fortification and fire-drill channels can be at play. Overall, this study sheds light on how companies balance financial demands of shareholders with the tax obligations to the government in their tax strategy decisions, which may provide valuable insights into how businesses keep the balance between multiple stakeholders.