Against epigenetic responsibility: The problem of causality in 'foetal programming' science.

Abstract

Emerging evidence that intrauterine exposures to environmental stressors can 'programme' epigenetic modifications in offspring, leading to long-lasting health risks, has generated debate about whether prospective mothers have a specific 'epigenetic' moral responsibility. However, to date, proposals for maternal epigenetic responsibility have failed to grapple adequately with the uncertainty of scientific evidence, and specifically, whether the causal basis for intrauterine epigenetic effects is sufficiently established to ground claims of moral responsibility. Causality is widely considered a necessary condition for the attribution of moral responsibility. In this paper, we show that much foetal programming science in humans has yet to establish a causal epigenetic connection between intrauterine exposures and subsequent offspring health impacts. This research struggles to establish that the relationship between such exposures and offspring health risks is in fact causal, neither has it been able to evince the causal significance of exposures during pregnancy to such outcomes. We argue that these two challenges to establishing causality in foetal programming research seriously undercut the idea that prospective mothers may have a moral responsibility to ensure the epigenetics of their offspring.