Peter H Ditto, Jared B Celniker, Shiri Spitz Siddiqi, Mertcan Güngör, Daniel P Relihan
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article reviews empirical data demonstrating robust ingroup favoritism in political judgment. Partisans display systematic tendencies to seek out, believe, and remember information that supports their political beliefs and affinities. However, the psychological drivers of partisan favoritism have been vigorously debated, as has its consistency with rational inference. We characterize decades-long debates over whether such tendencies violate normative standards of rationality, focusing on the phenomenon of motivated reasoning. In light of evidence that both motivational and cognitive factors contribute to partisan bias, we advocate for a descriptive approach to partisan bias research. Rather than adjudicating the (ir)rationality of partisan favoritism, future research should prioritize the identification and measurement of its predictors and clarify the cognitive mechanisms underlying motivated political reasoning. Ultimately, we argue that political judgment is best evaluated by a standard of ecological rationality based on its practical implications for individual well-being and functional democratic governance.
期刊介绍:
The Annual Review of Psychology, a publication that has been available since 1950, provides comprehensive coverage of the latest advancements in psychological research. It encompasses a wide range of topics, including the biological underpinnings of human behavior, the intricacies of our senses and perception, the functioning of the mind, animal behavior and learning, human development, psychopathology, clinical and counseling psychology, social psychology, personality, environmental psychology, community psychology, and much more. In a recent development, the current volume of this esteemed journal has transitioned from a subscription-based model to an open access format as part of the Annual Reviews' Subscribe to Open initiative. As a result, all articles published in this volume are now freely accessible to the public under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.