{"title":"A corruption dilemma","authors":"James Ahloy , Rebecca Gilland , John R. Hamman","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106693","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We experimentally investigate the effects of uncertain negative externalities on corruption engagement and social beliefs. We report two experiments in which corruption is modeled as a common-pool resource. In our first experiment, participants face a decision to bribe a public official for a service where accepted bribes impose probabilistic external costs on the briber and other participants. We find that the decision to bribe is positively associated with the belief that others will do the same. We also find that participants overestimate their ability to avoid external costs. Experiment 2 explores endogeneity and ambiguity in types using a contextualized version of the corruption dilemma. Consistent with experiment 1, choosing to offer a bribe is positively associated with the expectation of similar behavior. Curiously, we find little evidence that beliefs about one’s own type affect the decision to bribe.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106693"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002993","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
We experimentally investigate the effects of uncertain negative externalities on corruption engagement and social beliefs. We report two experiments in which corruption is modeled as a common-pool resource. In our first experiment, participants face a decision to bribe a public official for a service where accepted bribes impose probabilistic external costs on the briber and other participants. We find that the decision to bribe is positively associated with the belief that others will do the same. We also find that participants overestimate their ability to avoid external costs. Experiment 2 explores endogeneity and ambiguity in types using a contextualized version of the corruption dilemma. Consistent with experiment 1, choosing to offer a bribe is positively associated with the expectation of similar behavior. Curiously, we find little evidence that beliefs about one’s own type affect the decision to bribe.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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