Clean energy ship application to promote carbon neutrality in global maritime industry: State governance or international supervision？

Abstract

The global maritime industry is facing the goal to achieve "carbon neutrality", and substituting traditional ship fuel with clean energy is the most important solution. Whether to promote clean-energy ships through state governance or unified international supervision to achieve carbon neutrality has been a long-standing debate. This study employs both a tripartite evolutionary game model and a quadrilateral evolutionary game model to compare the effectiveness of state governance and unified international supervision in promoting clean-energy ships. The tripartite model simulates interactions between local governments, shipping companies, and shippers, revealing that high subsidy costs reduce local governments' incentives to promote clean-energy ships. The quadrilateral model introduces international supervision, demonstrating that a unified international oversight mechanism can accelerate the global maritime industry's progress toward carbon neutrality. Numerical simulations indicate that lowering the purchase costs of clean-energy ships and introducing government subsidies significantly influence the adoption of clean-energy ships, while supervision costs impact the effectiveness of international regulations. These findings provide critical insights for policymakers aiming to balance financial incentives and global supervision strategies to foster low-carbon development in the maritime sector.