Number nativism1

IF 1.3 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Sam Clarke
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Number Nativism is the view that humans innately represent precise natural numbers. Despite a long and venerable history, it is often considered hopelessly out of touch with the empirical record. I argue that this is a mistake. After clarifying Number Nativism and distancing it from related conjectures, I distinguish three arguments which have been seen to refute the view. I argue that, while popular, two of these arguments miss the mark, and fail to place pressure on Number Nativism. Meanwhile, a third argument is best construed as a challenge: rather than refuting Number Nativism, it challenges its proponents to provide positive evidence for their thesis and show that this can be squared with apparent counterevidence. In response, I introduce psycholinguistic work on The Tolerance Principle (not yet considered in this context), propose that it is hard to make sense of without positing precise and innate representations of natural numbers, and argue that there is no obvious reason why these innate representations couldn't serve as a basis for mature numeric conception.
本土主义人数1
数本位主义认为人类天生就代表精确的自然数。尽管它有着悠久而古老的历史,却常常被认为与经验记录完全脱节。我认为这是一个错误。在澄清 "数本位主义 "并将其与相关猜想区分开来之后,我区分了三个被认为可以反驳该观点的论点。我认为,尽管这些论点很流行,但其中两个论点没有击中要害,未能对 "数本位论 "施加压力。与此同时,第三个论点最好被理解为一种挑战:与其说它是在反驳 "数字自然主义",不如说是在挑战其支持者,要求他们为自己的论点提供正面证据,并证明这些证据可以与明显的反证平起平坐。作为回应,我介绍了关于 "容忍原则 "的心理语言学研究(尚未在此背景下考虑),提出如果不假设自然数的精确和先天表征,就很难理解这一原则,并认为没有明显的理由说明为什么这些先天表征不能作为成熟数字概念的基础。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.
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