Professionals do play Minimax: Revisiting the Nash equilibrium in Major League Baseball

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Abstract

We present a game-theoretic model of baseball as a two-by-two normal-form game between pitchers and batters, where batters decide whether to swing or hold, and pitchers choose whether to throw inside or outside the strike zone. We use machine learning to label pitches that have not been swung at. Our approach enables testing of the predictions derived from the Minimax Theorem for both players. The hypotheses of equality of payoffs across actions and the absence of serial correlation hold for the majority of players. Batters exhibit lower swing rates than theoretical predictions, while pitchers tend to throw inside the strike zone more frequently than expected.

职业球员确实在玩 Minimax:重新审视美国职业棒球大联盟的纳什均衡
我们提出了一个棒球博弈论模型,即投手和击球手之间的二乘二正则表达式博弈,其中击球手决定挥棒还是持球,投手选择投掷打击区内还是打击区外的球。我们使用机器学习来标记未挥棒的投球。我们的方法可以测试从最小最大定理中得出的对双方选手的预测。对于大多数球员来说,不同行动间报酬相等和不存在序列相关性的假设成立。击球手的挥棒率低于理论预测值,而投球手在打击区内投球的频率往往高于预期。
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