Serial Acquirers and Innovation Performance

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Chandra S. Mishra
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study the innovation performance of serial acquirers. We further examine whether managerial ability influences the relationship between acquisition frequency and innovation performance. The emerging behavioral theory suggests that high-ability managers would pursue innovative opportunities via frequent acquisitions. We employ a sample of acquirers using 6477 firm-year observations over the 2006–2016 period and find frequent acquirers have higher innovation performance relative to nonfrequent acquirers. We employ two novel measures of innovation performance, namely, innovation premium and shadow option premium. Innovation performance is the financial effectiveness of a firm's innovation activities. Managerial ability enhances the relationship between acquisition frequency and innovation performance. Moreover, the acquisition frequency enhances the relationship between managerial ability and innovation performance. We find innovative firms are more likely to be frequent acquirers. Our results are consistent with the emerging behavioral theory of the firm. Managers are likely to seize innovative opportunities promptly via frequent acquisitions, and thus, frequent acquirers are more likely to have higher innovation performance relative to nonfrequent acquirers. There appears to be a potential causal cycle from greater managerial ability to a greater acquisition frequency to a higher innovation performance.
连续收购者与创新绩效
我们研究了连续收购者的创新绩效。我们进一步研究了管理能力是否会影响收购频率与创新绩效之间的关系。新兴的行为理论认为,高能力经理人会通过频繁收购来寻求创新机会。我们采用 2006-2016 年间 6477 个公司年观测数据作为收购者样本,发现频繁收购者的创新绩效高于非频繁收购者。我们采用了两种新的创新绩效衡量方法,即创新溢价和影子期权溢价。创新绩效是指企业创新活动的财务效益。管理能力会增强收购频率与创新绩效之间的关系。此外,收购频率会增强管理能力与创新绩效之间的关系。我们发现,创新型企业更有可能是频繁的收购者。我们的研究结果与新兴的企业行为理论相一致。管理者有可能通过频繁收购迅速抓住创新机会,因此,相对于非频繁收购者,频繁收购者更有可能获得更高的创新绩效。从更高的管理能力到更高的收购频率,再到更高的创新绩效,似乎存在一个潜在的因果循环。
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
19.00%
发文量
604
审稿时长
5.3 months
期刊介绍: Management of technical functions such as research, development, and engineering in industry, government, university, and other settings. Emphasis is on studies carried on within an organization to help in decision making or policy formation for RD&E.
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