Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.009

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper investigates the dynamics of product adoption under incomplete information regarding the product quality. A new agent observes a small sample of product choices within the population and receives a noisy private signal regarding the realized state of the world. Using simple heuristics, the agent estimates both the product quality and the distribution of product choices in the population. The agent then chooses a product that is a best response to this estimate. We show that fast adoption of the optimal product in the population occurs if and only if the strength of the private signal exceeds a certain threshold.

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不完全信息下的私人信号和快速产品采用

本文研究了在产品质量信息不完全的情况下产品采用的动态过程。一个新的代理观察到人口中产品选择的一个小样本，并接收到一个关于世界实现状态的有噪声的私人信号。代理利用简单的启发式方法，估算出产品质量和产品选择在群体中的分布。然后，代理选择一种对这一估计做出最佳反应的产品。我们的研究表明，只有当私人信号的强度超过某个阈值时，最优产品才会在人群中被快速采用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology