{"title":"Decision-Making Capacity and Authenticity.","authors":"Tim Aylsworth, Jake Greenblum","doi":"10.1007/s11673-024-10372-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>There is wide consensus among bioethicists about the importance of autonomy when determining whether or not a patient has the right to refuse life-saving treatment (LST). In this context, autonomy has typically been understood in terms of the patient's ability to make an informed decision. According to the traditional view, decision-making capacity (DMC) is seen as both necessary and sufficient for the right to refuse LST. Recently, this view has been challenged by those who think that considerations of authenticity and putative counterexamples should lead us to revise the traditional account. In this paper, we respond to these revisionist arguments, and we defend the traditional view according to which we have autonomy-based reasons to respect a patient's decision to refuse LST if and only if she has DMC.</p>","PeriodicalId":50252,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Bioethical Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Bioethical Inquiry","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-024-10372-w","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
There is wide consensus among bioethicists about the importance of autonomy when determining whether or not a patient has the right to refuse life-saving treatment (LST). In this context, autonomy has typically been understood in terms of the patient's ability to make an informed decision. According to the traditional view, decision-making capacity (DMC) is seen as both necessary and sufficient for the right to refuse LST. Recently, this view has been challenged by those who think that considerations of authenticity and putative counterexamples should lead us to revise the traditional account. In this paper, we respond to these revisionist arguments, and we defend the traditional view according to which we have autonomy-based reasons to respect a patient's decision to refuse LST if and only if she has DMC.
期刊介绍:
The JBI welcomes both reports of empirical research and articles that increase theoretical understanding of medicine and health care, the health professions and the biological sciences. The JBI is also open to critical reflections on medicine and conventional bioethics, the nature of health, illness and disability, the sources of ethics, the nature of ethical communities, and possible implications of new developments in science and technology for social and cultural life and human identity. We welcome contributions from perspectives that are less commonly published in existing journals in the field and reports of empirical research studies using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies.
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