The minimal computational substrate of fluid intelligence

Abstract

The quantification of cognitive powers rests on identifying a behavioural task that depends on them. Such dependence cannot be assured, for the powers a task invokes cannot be experimentally controlled or constrained a priori, resulting in unknown vulnerability to failure of specificity and generalisability. Evaluating a compact version of Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM), a widely used clinical test of fluid intelligence, we show that LaMa, a self-supervised artificial neural network trained solely on the completion of partially masked images of natural environmental scenes, achieves representative human-level test scores a prima vista, without any task-specific inductive bias or training. Compared with cohorts of healthy and focally lesioned participants, LaMa exhibits human-like variation with item difficulty, and produces errors characteristic of right frontal lobe damage under degradation of its ability to integrate global spatial patterns. LaMa's narrow training and limited capacity suggest matrix-style tests may be open to computationally simple solutions that need not necessarily invoke the substrates of reasoning.