{"title":"Analysis of charging tariffs for residential electric vehicle users based on Stackelberg game","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.egyr.2024.07.054","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Establishing a rational pricing mechanism for electric vehicles (EVs) can incentivize users to engage in charging activities, foster positive consumption behaviors, and indirectly benefit the grid by increasing load demand. Therefore, this paper conducts a Stackelberg game study between the grid and EV users by utilizing real charging and discharging data of EV users in F city. First, the price elasticity of EV users' electricity consumption behavior is analyzed. Second, the Stackelberg game model is constructed, multiple tariff schemes are designed to calculate the equilibrium tariff of the game, and the benefits of the grid and EV users are analyzed in comparison with the tariff policy that will be implemented in F city. Lastly, different seasonal scenarios are constructed to extend the applicability of the research results. It is found that Scheme 3 effectively incentivizes charging load growth, increases cross-subsidies and transmission and distribution fees, and protects the level of charging and discharging costs for residents; furthermore, lowering charging and discharging tariffs during seasons of high price elasticity for residents to increase demand is an optimal strategy for grid pricing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":11798,"journal":{"name":"Energy Reports","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484724004803/pdfft?md5=39373618b9dc4fd763a93e7182eb5ceb&pid=1-s2.0-S2352484724004803-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Energy Reports","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484724004803","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ENERGY & FUELS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Establishing a rational pricing mechanism for electric vehicles (EVs) can incentivize users to engage in charging activities, foster positive consumption behaviors, and indirectly benefit the grid by increasing load demand. Therefore, this paper conducts a Stackelberg game study between the grid and EV users by utilizing real charging and discharging data of EV users in F city. First, the price elasticity of EV users' electricity consumption behavior is analyzed. Second, the Stackelberg game model is constructed, multiple tariff schemes are designed to calculate the equilibrium tariff of the game, and the benefits of the grid and EV users are analyzed in comparison with the tariff policy that will be implemented in F city. Lastly, different seasonal scenarios are constructed to extend the applicability of the research results. It is found that Scheme 3 effectively incentivizes charging load growth, increases cross-subsidies and transmission and distribution fees, and protects the level of charging and discharging costs for residents; furthermore, lowering charging and discharging tariffs during seasons of high price elasticity for residents to increase demand is an optimal strategy for grid pricing.
建立合理的电动汽车(EV)定价机制可以激励用户参与充电活动,促进积极的消费行为,并通过增加负荷需求间接使电网受益。因此,本文利用 F 市电动汽车用户的真实充放电数据,对电网和电动汽车用户之间进行了堆栈博弈研究。首先,分析了电动汽车用户用电行为的价格弹性。其次,构建斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型,设计多种电价方案,计算博弈的均衡电价,并对比 F 市即将实施的电价政策,分析电网和电动汽车用户的收益。最后,构建了不同的季节情景,以扩大研究成果的适用性。研究发现,方案 3 有效激励了充电负荷增长,增加了交叉补贴和输配电费,保障了居民充放电成本水平;此外,在居民价格弹性较高的季节降低充放电电价以增加需求是电网定价的最优策略。
期刊介绍:
Energy Reports is a new online multidisciplinary open access journal which focuses on publishing new research in the area of Energy with a rapid review and publication time. Energy Reports will be open to direct submissions and also to submissions from other Elsevier Energy journals, whose Editors have determined that Energy Reports would be a better fit.