Information disclosure strategies of live-streaming supply chains in the digi-economy era

IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Xiaoyong Ma, Shuai Liu
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Abstract

Live e-commerce is one of the important forms of digital transformation of supply chain, which has become increasingly popular in recent years as a powerful tool for internet advertising, interaction, and merchandising. We propose two pricing models to examine the strategies of information disclosure and pricing within the live-streaming supply chain. One model revolves around the agency framework, wherein the manufacturer determines the price while the streamer decides the level of information disclosure. The other model pertains to a self-implementing framework, wherein the manufacturer determines both the level of information disclosure and the price. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we extend our models to encompass three significant scenarios: (i) the platform involvement model, where a live-streaming support platform becomes part of the supply chain; (ii) the fixed price model, which externalizes the manufacturer's pricing decision; and (iii) the dual-channel operations model. Our analysis reveals that the cost associated with information disclosure impacts the streamer's profits in a nonlinear manner within the agency model. Interestingly, expanding the revenue-sharing parameter does not invariably favor the manufacturer. Moreover, we observe that none of the live-streaming sales models exhibits a clear advantage over the others. Additionally, we demonstrate that the platform's involvement limits the manufacturer's ability to utilize the agency model for live-streaming sales. In situations with fixed pricing, the manufacturer is advised to disclose more production information during live-streaming sales.

Abstract Image

数字经济时代直播供应链的信息披露策略
电商直播是供应链数字化转型的重要形式之一,作为互联网广告、互动和商品销售的有力工具,近年来越来越受到人们的青睐。我们提出了两种定价模型来研究直播供应链中的信息披露和定价策略。一种模式围绕代理框架,即制造商决定价格,而流媒体决定信息披露水平。另一种模式涉及自我实施框架,即制造商决定信息披露水平和价格。为了评估我们研究结果的稳健性,我们扩展了我们的模型,以涵盖三种重要情况:(i) 平台参与模式,直播支持平台成为供应链的一部分;(ii) 固定价格模式,将制造商的定价决策外部化;(iii) 双渠道运营模式。我们的分析表明,在代理模式中,与信息披露相关的成本会以非线性方式影响流媒体的利润。有趣的是,扩大收入分享参数并不总是有利于制造商。此外,我们还发现,与其他模式相比,没有一种直播销售模式表现出明显的优势。此外,我们还证明,平台的参与限制了制造商利用代理模式进行直播销售的能力。在定价固定的情况下,建议制造商在直播销售中披露更多的生产信息。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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