How to Do Without Encroachment

IF 1.8 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

MIND Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzae029

Sarah Moss

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper defends a version of epistemic contextualism that accounts for the ordinary judgements and theoretical principles that motivate pragmatic encroachment. Adopting this contextualist view, we can avoid the counterintuitive consequences of pragmatic encroachment, while still preserving its attractive applications.

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如何做到不受侵占

本文为认识论语境主义的一个版本辩护，它解释了促使实用主义侵蚀的普通判断和理论原则。采用这种语境主义观点，我们就能避免实用主义侵蚀的反直觉后果，同时还能保留其诱人的应用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

MIND PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

3.10

自引率

5.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.