Jinghua Zhao, Ruishu Zhang, Zhuang Wang, Shaoyun Cui
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Decision-making regarding the low-carbon supply chain, considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the heterogeneous preferences of consumers, has become an urgent topic to be explored. This paper explores the decision-making problem of a low-carbon supply chain considering the heterogeneous preferences of consumers under different CSR situations, analyzes the influence of important parameters on each equilibrium solution, compares the size relationship of each equilibrium solution under different CSR situations, and verifies the conclusions obtained through numerical simulation. Then, based on the obtained equilibrium solution, a CSR evolutionary game model of the low-carbon supply chain is constructed, and the evolutionary stability strategies of the two sides on the CSR game are solved. Finally, the evolutionary trajectory of the game system is intuitively presented using a simulation method, and the influence of the main parameters on the evolutionary trends of the two sides is analyzed. The findings are as follows: (1) When both manufacturers and retailers undertake CSR, the retail price and wholesale price are their lowest, while carbon emission reduction, total market demand, manufacturer utility, retailer utility, and supply chain total utility are the highest. (2) When a company undertakes CSR, carbon emission reduction, total market demand, manufacturer utility, retailer utility, and supply chain total utility all increase with the increase in the CSR degree of the company and the ratio of the potential scale of low-carbon consumers to the potential scale of ordinary consumers. (3) The evolutionary stability strategy for both manufacturers and retailers is to undertake CSR. In addition, the initial proportion of manufacturers and retailers that undertake CSR, the low-carbon preference of low-carbon consumers, and the increase in the ratio of the potential scale of low-carbon consumers to the potential scale of ordinary consumers can encourage both members of the supply chain to undertake CSR.