Evolutionary analysis of airline networks under different airport-provided subsidy regimes in the context of multiple airport systems

IF 3.9 2区工程技术 Q2 TRANSPORTATION

Journal of Air Transport Management Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2024.102650

Xin Chen , Zhen Zhang , Chao Xuan , Rui Qiu

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

To determine the evolutionary trajectory of airline network selection under different airport-provided subsidy regimes in the context of multiple airport systems (MAS), we construct an evolutionary game model consisting of airports and airlines as the two involved parties and explore the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of both players under different scenarios, the factors influencing the evolutionary path of the stability strategies are also analyzed. The results show that: (1) ESS of airports is the low subsidy strategy, and airlines may evolve into the hub-spoke network or the point-to-point network. (2) From the perspective of total social welfare, it is preferable for airlines to choose the hub-spoke network. (3) Lower expected subsidies from non-hub airports and higher route fixed costs strongly encourage airlines to converge towards the hub-spoke network strategy as their stable equilibrium. (4) The increase in passenger demand in the MAS can encourage airports to choose the low subsidy strategy, and the increase of passenger demand served by non-hub airports has a dampening effect on the evolution equilibrium toward the hub-spoke network strategy. This study provides valuable insights for improving the airport-provided subsidy regimes of the aviation market and optimizing the development of the airline network.

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多机场系统背景下不同机场补贴制度下航空公司网络的演变分析

为了确定在多机场系统（MAS）背景下，不同机场补贴制度下航空公司网络选择的演化轨迹，我们构建了一个由机场和航空公司作为参与双方的演化博弈模型，并探讨了不同情景下参与双方的演化稳定策略（ESS），同时分析了影响稳定策略演化路径的因素。结果表明(1）机场的ESS为低补贴策略，航空公司可能演化为枢纽-辐状网络或点对点网络。(2) 从社会总福利的角度来看，航空公司更倾向于选择枢纽-辐状网络。(3) 较低的非枢纽机场预期补贴和较高的航线固定成本会促使航空公司趋向于选择枢纽-辐状网络策略作为其稳定均衡。(4）MAS 中客运需求的增加会鼓励机场选择低补贴策略，而非枢纽机场服务的客运需求的增加对向枢纽-辐状网络策略演化的均衡具有抑制作用。该研究为完善航空市场的机场补贴制度、优化航空网络发展提供了有价值的启示。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Air Transport Management TRANSPORTATION-

CiteScore

12.40

自引率

11.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Air Transport Management (JATM) sets out to address, through high quality research articles and authoritative commentary, the major economic, management and policy issues facing the air transport industry today. It offers practitioners and academics an international and dynamic forum for analysis and discussion of these issues, linking research and practice and stimulating interaction between the two. The refereed papers in the journal cover all the major sectors of the industry (airlines, airports, air traffic management) as well as related areas such as tourism management and logistics. Papers are blind reviewed, normally by two referees, chosen for their specialist knowledge. The journal provides independent, original and rigorous analysis in the areas of: • Policy, regulation and law • Strategy • Operations • Marketing • Economics and finance • Sustainability