{"title":"An empirical investigation of the mitigating effect of debt on overinvestment as shareholder rights vary","authors":"Chune Young Chung, Daejin Kim, Junyoup Lee","doi":"10.1111/boer.12471","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, we investigate the relationship between debt governance and overinvestment. We use net cash flows to debtholders as a proxy for debt governance and find that an increase in these cash flows mitigates firms' overinvestment. We also show that free cash flows lead cash-rich and cash-poor firms to overinvest but that debt governance attenuates this problem. Finally, we find that the mitigating effect of net cash flows to debtholders on overinvestment is highly pronounced in firms with poor governance. These findings suggest that net cash flows to debtholders are particularly effective when shareholder governance is weak. We conclude that cash flows to debtholders can effectively prevent overinvestment and reduce the agency costs of free cash flows.</p>","PeriodicalId":46233,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"76 4","pages":"1126-1149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Bulletin of Economic Research","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/boer.12471","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
In this study, we investigate the relationship between debt governance and overinvestment. We use net cash flows to debtholders as a proxy for debt governance and find that an increase in these cash flows mitigates firms' overinvestment. We also show that free cash flows lead cash-rich and cash-poor firms to overinvest but that debt governance attenuates this problem. Finally, we find that the mitigating effect of net cash flows to debtholders on overinvestment is highly pronounced in firms with poor governance. These findings suggest that net cash flows to debtholders are particularly effective when shareholder governance is weak. We conclude that cash flows to debtholders can effectively prevent overinvestment and reduce the agency costs of free cash flows.
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The Bulletin of Economic Research is an international journal publishing articles across the entire field of economics, econometrics and economic history. The Bulletin contains original theoretical, applied and empirical work which makes a substantial contribution to the subject and is of broad interest to economists. We welcome submissions in all fields and, with the Bulletin expanding in new areas, we particularly encourage submissions in the fields of experimental economics, financial econometrics and health economics. In addition to full-length articles the Bulletin publishes refereed shorter articles, notes and comments; authoritative survey articles in all areas of economics and special themed issues.
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