Self-directed productivity investment on the job

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-29 DOI:10.1002/mde.4334

Anthony M. Marino

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized to simultaneously work and exert effort to invest in human capital or process innovation so as to increase productivity in a future period. We characterize the conditions under which the principal would and would not want to incentivize such multitasking and the conditions under which the agent would want to participate. The firm's support for investment is contingent on the agent's outside market option not being too high, and sufficient conditions for a separate contingent payment for productivity increase are presented.

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工作中的自主生产力投资

本文研究了一个隐性行动代理模型，在该模型中，代理人可以在工作的同时受到激励，努力投资于人力资本或流程创新，以提高未来一段时间的生产率。我们描述了委托人愿意或不愿意激励这种多重任务的条件，以及代理人愿意参与的条件。公司对投资的支持取决于代理人的外部市场选择权是否过高，并提出了为提高生产率而单独支付或有报酬的充分条件。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.