Virtual Worlds of Neurophenomenology

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Maksim Miroshnichenko
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this article, the perspectives of Francisco Varela and Thomas Metzinger on the notion of selfhood are explored, highlighting their differences and similar­ities. The focus is on how the perception of self and the surrounding world is in­separable from elements of virtuality and simulation, which are vital in cognitive processes. Metzinger emphasizes perception’s illusory and simulated nature, whereas Varela considers phenomenal perception an actively created virtual real­ity. Both approaches challenge the traditional view of a stable, centralized ‘self’, seeing selfhood as the result of multiple interacting processes. Varela is centered on an enactivist vision, treating active engagement with the world as a crucial el­ement in forming selfhood. At the same time, Metzinger focuses on phenomenal self-modeling and the illusory nature of selfhood. The article also addresses the ethical differences between the two concepts. Metzinger points to potential issues in creating self-aware AI, while Varela sees in the understanding of a non-substantial ‘self’ the possibility for deeper engagement with the world, suggest­ing freedom from the constraints of rigidly stabilized selfhood and openness to diverse aspects of the environment.
神经现象学的虚拟世界
本文探讨了弗朗西斯科-瓦雷拉(Francisco Varela)和托马斯-梅青格(Thomas Metzinger)关于自我同一性概念的观点,突出了他们之间的异同。重点在于对自我和周围世界的感知如何与认知过程中至关重要的虚幻和模拟元素密不可分。梅津格强调感知的虚幻性和模拟性,而瓦雷拉则认为现象感知是一种主动创造的虚拟现实。这两种方法都挑战了稳定、集中的 "自我 "这一传统观点,将自我视为多重互动过程的结果。瓦雷拉的核心是 "行为主义 "视角,将与世界的积极互动视为形成自我的关键因素。与此同时,Metzinger 则关注现象自我建模和自我身份的虚幻性。文章还探讨了这两个概念之间的伦理差异。梅津格指出了创造具有自我意识的人工智能的潜在问题,而瓦雷拉则从对非实体 "自我 "的理解中看到了与世界进行更深层次接触的可能性,这表明人们可以摆脱僵化稳定的自我身份的束缚,并对环境的不同方面持开放态度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
VOPROSY FILOSOFII
VOPROSY FILOSOFII PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
50.00%
发文量
100
期刊介绍: "Вопросы философии" - академическое научное издание, центральный философский журнал в России. В настоящее время является органом Президиума Российской Академии Наук. Журнал "Вопросы философии" исторически тесно связан с Институтом философии РАН. Выходит ежемесячно. Журнал был основан в июле 1947 г. Интернет-версия журнала запущена в мае 2009 года.
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