Pomeranian Campaign (1712–1713): Reconnaissance and Sabotage Activities of the Russian Army

Abstract

Introduction. During the Great Northern War, the Russian army conducted many military campaigns in various theaters of combat operations. Many research papers have been devoted to the study of these events, but the events in Northern Germany (1712–1713) were not sufficiently disclosed. The article, with the involvement of sources on the history of the so-called “Pomeranian campaign,” including those not yet introduced into scientific circulation, reveals the features of conducting intelligence and sabotage activities of the army of Peter I in the conditions of a small war. Мaterials. The research is based on both published documents and those stored in archives, which allow us to restore the chronology of events and the methods of conducting intelligence and sabotage activities of the Petrovsky troops. Analysis. A comparison of the documentary evidence of the participants of the Pomeranian campaign, as well as research by Danish military historians, made it possible to determine the main methods of conducting reconnaissance and sabotage activities of Peter I’s troops in this theater of operations and to build a chronology of the events of the period 1712–1713, as well as the place and role of tactical intelligence assessment in the overall course of the campaign. Results. Despite the conditionally zero result of the Russian army, it was possible to achieve several significant results in Pomerania, in which the reconnaissance and sabotage activities of its troops played an important role, with the ability to expect the actions of the enemy and to stop threats from his side. Methods and materials. The basis of the source base was made up of documents stored in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, as well as published materials: correspondence between the Most Serene Prince and Peter I, heads of offices and contractors, as well as notes and diaries of eyewitnesses. The study of published and archival sources and the analysis and comparison of the information contained in them make it possible to reveal the role of St. Petersburg governor A.D. Menshikov in the creation of a regularly built-up port city. Analysis. Before the laying of the Kronstadt fortress on October 7, 1723, the settlement on Kotlin had no name. The first stone houses on the southern coast of the island were erected by the forces of the provinces; therefore, they were called “provincial.” After the start of the second regional reform, the completion of the provincial houses was entrusted to Senator M.M. Samarin. The construction of all stone buildings Peter I entrusted to A.D. Menshikov. In 1720, the Office of the Construction of Kotlin Stone Houses was created to conduct work. In connection with the beginning of the construction of the canal (the future Petrovsky Dock), the wooden residential buildings and outbuildings located near the seacoast were demolished or moved inland. At the beginning of 1724, the stone houses in the “bracket” – the sea gates of Kronstadt – were transferred to the associates of the first Russian emperor and naval officers. Results. In historiography, all stone houses built in 1717–1725 on Kotlin are what it is customary to call “provincial.” The buildings begun in 1719 under the leadership of A.D. Menshikov were built on the model of the provincial ones, but they were called “the houses of his royal majesty.” The office of the construction of the Kotlin stone houses carried out work at a faster pace, which was facilitated by the huge administrative resources of the Petersburg governor.