Decentralization, local information, and effort substitution: Evidence from a subnational decentralization reform in China

Governance Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI:10.1111/gove.12884
Sicheng Chen, Lingran Yuan, Weijie Wang, Binlei Gong
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Abstract

This study examines whether and how information asymmetry affects local governments' gaming behaviors in a decentralization reform. We contend that adequate access to local information by the principal is a prerequisite for mitigating effort substitution among agents. We examine the hypothesis based on a decentralization reform in China—the Integration of Agriculture‐related Fiscal Transfer reform. We use the distance between pilot villages and the provincial capital as the measurement of local information. Employing a difference‐in‐differences design to scrutinize a unique dataset comprising 85,628 observations spanning 9199 villages from 2011 to 2020, we find that subnational decentralization with information asymmetry leads to increased effort substitution by local governments. Further analysis reveals that more abundant local information can alleviate the extent of effort substitution in reformed villages. Overall, this research highlights the importance of considering local information when designing policies to mitigate performance gaming in public goods provision and support effective subnational decentralization.
权力下放、地方信息和努力替代:中国国家以下各级权力下放改革的证据
本研究探讨了信息不对称是否以及如何影响地方政府在权力下放改革中的博弈行为。我们认为,委托人充分获取地方信息是减轻代理人之间努力替代的先决条件。我们以中国的一项分权改革--涉农财政转移支付一体化改革--为基础,对这一假设进行了研究。我们使用试点村与省会之间的距离作为当地信息的衡量标准。我们采用差分法设计了一个独特的数据集,该数据集由 2011 年至 2020 年间 9199 个村庄的 85628 个观测值组成。进一步的分析表明,更丰富的地方信息可以减轻改革后村庄的努力替代程度。总之,这项研究强调了在制定政策时考虑地方信息的重要性,以减少公共产品提供过程中的绩效博弈,支持有效的国家以下各级权力下放。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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