Non-Parametric Identification and Testing of Quantal Response Equilibrium

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Johannes Hoelzemann, Ryan Webb, Erhao Xie
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper studies the falsifiability and identification of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) when each player's utility and error distribution are relaxed to be unknown non-parametric functions. Using the variation of players' choices across a series of games, we first show that both the utility function and the distribution of errors are non-parametrically over-identified. This over-identification result further suggests a straightforward testing procedure for QRE which achieves the desired type-1 error and maintains a small type-2 error. To apply this methodology, we conduct an experimental study of the matching pennies game. Our non-parametric estimates strongly reject the conventional Logit choice probability. Moreover, when the utility and the error distribution are sufficiently flexible and heterogeneous, the quantal response hypothesis cannot be rejected for 70% of participants. However, strong assumptions such as linear utility, logistically distributed errors, and homogeneity lead to substantially higher rejection rates.
数量反应平衡的非参数识别和测试
本文研究了当每个博弈者的效用和误差分布被放松为未知非参数函数时,量子响应均衡(QRE)的可证伪性和可识别性。利用博弈者在一系列博弈中的选择变化,我们首先证明了效用函数和误差分布都是非参数过度识别的。这一过度识别结果进一步提出了一种直接的 QRE 检验程序,该程序既能达到理想的类型 1 误差,又能保持较小的类型 2 误差。为了应用这一方法,我们对配对便士游戏进行了实验研究。我们的非参数估计强烈拒绝了传统的 Logit 选择概率。此外,当效用和误差分布足够灵活和异质时,70% 的参与者都不能拒绝量子响应假设。然而,线性效用、逻辑分布误差和同质性等强假设会导致更高的拒绝率。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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