{"title":"Private monitoring revisited: When does a shared history matter?","authors":"Xue Xu , Kun Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102269","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study experimentally whether and when a shared history of signals affects players’ incentives to cooperate in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. We compare games where the player can privately observe imperfect signals about her partner’s actions to games where signals are perfect and games where signals are imperfect but public. Based on evidence from multiple specifications of stage payoffs, we find that when the return to cooperation is low, subjects are more likely to cooperate in games with public signals than in games with private signals. However, when the return to cooperation is high, the difference is not significant. Furthermore, we show evidence that strategies are more lenient with public signals than with private signals when the return to cooperation is low. The results suggest that a shared history of signals could increase players’ incentives to cooperate when the return to cooperation is low.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221480432400106X","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We study experimentally whether and when a shared history of signals affects players’ incentives to cooperate in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. We compare games where the player can privately observe imperfect signals about her partner’s actions to games where signals are perfect and games where signals are imperfect but public. Based on evidence from multiple specifications of stage payoffs, we find that when the return to cooperation is low, subjects are more likely to cooperate in games with public signals than in games with private signals. However, when the return to cooperation is high, the difference is not significant. Furthermore, we show evidence that strategies are more lenient with public signals than with private signals when the return to cooperation is low. The results suggest that a shared history of signals could increase players’ incentives to cooperate when the return to cooperation is low.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.
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