A Pricing Model Study of Shared Parking Area Charge Based on Game Theory

IF 2.3 4区 社会学 Q1 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY
Systems Pub Date : 2024-07-27 DOI:10.3390/systems12080269
Chao Sun, Haodong Jing, Haowei Yin
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Abstract

In this study, a tripartite decision-making parking pricing model was developed based on Game Theory to comprehensively reflect the impact of parking pricing on private car travelers, parking lot operators, and traffic managers. Utility theory is introduced to analyze the behavioral characteristics of the tripartite participants in parking pricing. A parking behavior model for private car travelers, an operating profit model for parking lot operators, and a social negative utility model for traffic managers are established. This article presents an analysis of the mutual influence between them based on a game theory perspective and introduces parking saturation and road saturation as new factors influencing parking pricing to address the interactive relationship among the tripartite participants. A parking pricing model based on tripartite games is established, and a solution algorithm is designed. The results indicate that when the parking fee rates for the two public parking lots in the scenario are 8.5 CNY/h and 9 CNY/h, respectively, the parking demand is 300, and the sum of the total travel costs of private car travelers and the total operating profits are CNY 20,589 and 2187.9, respectively. The parking saturation of the public parking lot and the difference between the expected value is minimized to 0.25, and the road saturation and the difference between the expected value are minimized to 1.48, which is the parking pricing plan that minimizes the conflicts of interest among the tripartite stakeholders in the tripartite game. The parking pricing model of a public parking lot provides a reference for formulating parking fee strategies that comprehensively reflect the needs of the three parties involved in the public parking lot.
基于博弈论的共享停车区域收费定价模型研究
本研究以博弈论为基础,建立了停车定价三方决策模型,以全面反映停车定价对私家车出行者、停车场经营者和交通管理者的影响。引入效用理论分析停车定价三方参与者的行为特征。建立了私家车出行者的停车行为模型、停车场经营者的经营利润模型和交通管理者的社会负效用模型。本文基于博弈论的视角分析了它们之间的相互影响,并引入停车饱和度和道路饱和度作为影响停车定价的新因素,以解决三方参与者之间的互动关系。建立了基于三方博弈的停车定价模型,并设计了求解算法。结果表明,当情景中两个公共停车场的停车费率分别为 8.5 元/小时和 9 元/小时时,停车需求为 300,私家车出行者的总出行成本和总经营利润之和分别为 20589 元和 2187.9 元。公共停车场的停车饱和度与期望值之差最小为 0.25,道路饱和度与期望值之差最小为 1.48,是三方博弈中三方利益相关者利益冲突最小的停车定价方案。公共停车场的停车定价模型为制定全面反映公共停车场三方需求的停车收费策略提供了参考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Systems
Systems Decision Sciences-Information Systems and Management
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
15.80%
发文量
204
审稿时长
11 weeks
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