State, crime and violence in Mexico, 1920–2000: Arbiters of impunity, agents of coercion

Abstract

The nature of the relationships among the Mexican state, organized crime and violence is much debated. Many accounts of state formation suggest that states increase their extractive and coercive capabilities in tandem: they monopolize the provision of ‘protection’ in Charles Tilly’s famous analogy. However, when unconsolidated states confront lucrative, illicit markets, state-building takes an unexpected turn. We argue that these states, like post-revolutionary Mexico, develop not as one protection racket, but as two. While the orthodox or licit protection racket collects tax from businesses and individuals in return for the protection of property and persons, the illicit protection racket (like that of a traditional mafia organization) collects extortion money from criminal groups in return for protection from prosecution. Though we use the case study of Mexico to tease out these conclusions, we argue that they can just as easily be applied to other states with weak tax bases, limited geographical reach, and profitable illicit markets.