Precision of Public Information Disclosures, Banks' Stability, and Welfare

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
DIEGO MORENO, TUOMAS TAKALO
{"title":"Precision of Public Information Disclosures, Banks' Stability, and Welfare","authors":"DIEGO MORENO, TUOMAS TAKALO","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13194","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Consider a bank which chooses an asset portfolio and then, upon the public disclosure of the results of a review of its quality, raises funds by offering a repayment promise. We show that increasing the precision of information about the quality of the bank's assets lowers the cost of funding of a sound bank and encourages it to take risk. Maximum stability is reached in an opaque environment. Maximum surplus is reached in an opaque (transparent) environment when the social costs of bank failure are large (small). We examine how these conclusions change under alternative information and contractual conditions.","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13194","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Consider a bank which chooses an asset portfolio and then, upon the public disclosure of the results of a review of its quality, raises funds by offering a repayment promise. We show that increasing the precision of information about the quality of the bank's assets lowers the cost of funding of a sound bank and encourages it to take risk. Maximum stability is reached in an opaque environment. Maximum surplus is reached in an opaque (transparent) environment when the social costs of bank failure are large (small). We examine how these conclusions change under alternative information and contractual conditions.
公共信息披露的精度、银行的稳定性和福利
考虑一家银行,该银行选择一个资产组合,然后在公开披露资产质量审查结果后,通过提供还款承诺来筹集资金。我们的研究表明,提高银行资产质量信息的精确度可以降低稳健银行的融资成本,并鼓励其承担风险。在不透明的环境中达到最大稳定性。当银行倒闭的社会成本较大(较小)时,在不透明(透明)环境中会出现最大盈余。我们研究了这些结论在其他信息和合同条件下的变化情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
6.70%
发文量
98
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信