{"title":"The spread of misinformation in networks with individual and social learning","authors":"Sebastiano Della Lena","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104804","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper studies the spread of misinformation when agents have both individual and social learning. In the presence of sources of misinformation, the most vulnerable and harmful agents are those with poor individual learning and high centrality in the network. However, if opinions are polarized, providing some agents with better private information can backfire on other agents. Moreover, the incentives to spread misinformation have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the spreader’s influence; and, under certain conditions, an unaware spreader can be more harmful than a purposeful one. Overall, this paper warns that any policy that fails to consider both the precision of agents’ private information and the network structure runs the risk of backfiring.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292124001338/pdfft?md5=82cbc7704563386a5c57a0fe173972fa&pid=1-s2.0-S0014292124001338-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292124001338","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The paper studies the spread of misinformation when agents have both individual and social learning. In the presence of sources of misinformation, the most vulnerable and harmful agents are those with poor individual learning and high centrality in the network. However, if opinions are polarized, providing some agents with better private information can backfire on other agents. Moreover, the incentives to spread misinformation have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the spreader’s influence; and, under certain conditions, an unaware spreader can be more harmful than a purposeful one. Overall, this paper warns that any policy that fails to consider both the precision of agents’ private information and the network structure runs the risk of backfiring.
本文研究了当代理同时具有个人学习和社会学习能力时，错误信息的传播情况。在存在错误信息来源的情况下，最脆弱和最有害的代理是那些个人学习能力差、在网络中中心地位高的代理。然而，如果意见两极分化，为某些代理提供更好的私人信息可能会对其他代理产生反作用。此外，传播错误信息的动机与传播者的影响力呈倒 U 型关系；在某些条件下，不知情的传播者可能比有目的的传播者更有害。总之，本文警告说，任何既不考虑代理人私人信息的精确性又不考虑网络结构的政策都有可能适得其反。
期刊介绍：
The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
